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ABSTRACT 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
TWO EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
by 
Dawn L. Keig 
 
How do environmental institutional influences in a multinational enterprise’s 
(MNE’s) total portfolio of locations affect its social responsibility (and irresponsibility)? 
To begin to answer this question, I engaged in two complementary empirical research 
studies, each exploring a particular subset of the MNE portfolio environment-social 
responsibility dynamic.  
The first study applies the concept of institutional distance from the international 
business literature to examine how the differences in formal and informal institutional 
environments across a firm’s full portfolio of operating locations can affect its social 
performance. I hypothesize and find that firms with greater informal institutional distance 
within their locations will have lower overall levels of corporate social performance. I 
also suggest that greater average formal institutional distance within the MNE’s portfolio 
will moderate the social responsibility benefits associated with greater international 
scope. These hypotheses were tested and found to be supported using secondary data on a 
sample of 408 firms headquartered throughout Europe, Asia, and North America.
  
vii 
The second study also explores the institutional environment of MNEs and social 
responsibility, but from a different perspective. This study looks at the influence of 
institutionalized corruption on firms’ corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). Consistent 
with institutional theory, I conceptualize corruption as having both a formal and informal 
component and hypothesize that operating in portfolios of locations with greater formal 
and/or informal corruption environments may lead MNEs to have higher levels of social 
irresponsibility. Furthermore, I explore the relationship between irresponsible behavior 
and firm performance, finding that higher levels of firm CSiR are related to lower 
performance. Support for my social irresponsibility hypotheses was confirmed using a 
sample of 699 MNEs operating throughout the world. 
It has been noted that institutions matter to international business. These two 
studies help us better understand the complex institutional environments of MNEs and 
how specific institutional environments can matter to MNE social responsibility-related 
outcomes, providing guidance related to country selection for MNE managers concerned 
about maintaining high corporate social performance and minimizing incidents of social 
irresponsibility in their firms. 
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social performance (CSP), 
corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), institutional theory, institutional distance, 
corruption, multinational enterprise (MNE), portfolio, absorptive capacity 
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 
 
As multinational enterprises (MNEs) diversify internationally they face a variety 
of regulatory and cultural expectations in the foreign operating environments into which 
they are expanding (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Mohan, 2006). This may 
include specific local expectations related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Campbell, 2007). Despite the potential environmental complexity facing MNEs, existing 
social responsibility research tends to concentrate on domestic issues and contexts 
(Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Prior research has not yet helped MNE managers understand 
how the integration of a particular set of countries into their operational scope might 
positively or negatively affect their social responsibility-related outcomes.  
This represents a potentially significant problem for MNEs that have identified 
social responsibility as a strategic imperative. This gap in the literature inspired this 
dissertation to consider addressing the core question: How do environmental institutional 
influences in a MNE’s total portfolio of locations affect its overall social responsibility 
(and irresponsibility)? 
To begin to explore portfolio institutional links to social responsibility and 
irresponsibility, this dissertation incorporates two independent, but complementary, 
empirical research studies. The studies are independent in that each empirical study 
explores a particular subset of relationships between MNE institutional environments and 
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social responsibility-related outcomes. Each study also promotes and tests a unique 
research model and does so using completely separate constructs, variables, sample 
frames and samples, secondary data collections, and analytical techniques. This overall 
research design maximizes the value of the multi-paper dissertation format and enables 
the exploration of a more diverse set of international institutional-social responsibility 
dynamics. 
The two studies are also complementary in that they are tied together by three key 
thematic and conceptual commonalities. First, both studies look at the antecedents of 
social responsibility in an international context. Only a small percentage of CSR studies 
have examined firm social responsibility as a dependent variable (Margolis & Walsh, 
2003). Similarly, truly international social responsibility and irresponsibility research 
remains a relative rarity (Arthaud-Day, 2005; Egri & Ralston, 2008; Mohan, 2006). Both 
of my proposed studies examine specific environmental antecedents to social 
responsibility-related outcomes for MNEs, and each uses a wide sample of firms 
headquartered in and/or operating in all parts of the world. 
Second, both dissertation studies share a common theoretical foundation, 
institutional theory. Institutional theory recognizes that firms seek legitimacy within the 
their target markets (Scott, 2008) and rely on cues from both formal and informal 
institutions in their environments to understand and respond appropriately (North, 1990). 
Establishing legitimacy can become even more complex for MNEs who operate in 
multiple countries with potentially widely diverse institutional expectations (Kostova, 
Roth, & Dacin, 2008). National institutions can be strong determinants of firm-level 
social responsibility practices (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Jackson & Apostolakou, 
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2010). Thus, an institutional lens is used in both studies to examine the impact of a 
variety of environmental conditions on the social responsibility-related outcomes of 
MNEs. 
Third, both studies draw upon a paradigm used in the international business 
literature that conceptualizes the MNE as a unique portfolio of locations (Chao & Kumar, 
2010; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997; Kim & 
Park, 2002; Nachum & Song, 2011; Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011). In contrast to studies 
that focus specifically on home country or particular home-host dyads, this portfolio 
perspective incorporates the entire set of subsidiary locations which comprise a MNE’s 
operating portfolio, resulting in a more holistic consideration of the variety of 
environmental influences potentially affecting firm social responsibility outcomes. I 
propose that an MNE’s overall social responsibility posture and results can be expected 
to be influenced by the characteristics of its entire portfolio of locations, not just its 
headquarters country.  
Paper 1, “The Impact of MNE Portfolio Formal and Informal Institutional 
Distance on Corporate Social Performance”, applies the concept of institutional distance 
from the international business literature to examine how the institutional environments 
of a firm’s entire set of operating locations can affect its social performance. Institutional 
distance describes the similarities or differences between institutional elements in 
different countries (Kostova, 1999). Utilizing a portfolio conceptualization, formal and 
informal institutional distances are calculated based on the average differences between 
institutional attributes of the firm’s home country compared to corresponding attributes 
of all of the firm’s operating subsidiary locations.  
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I hypothesize and find that firms with greater informal institutional distance 
within their locations will have lower overall levels of corporate social performance. 
Informal institutions are driven largely by culture (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). Because 
each country represents a unique set of cultural attributes (Hofstede, 1980), the greater 
the differences between country cultures, the greater the difficulties a firm can expect in 
learning and meeting the unique local expectations (Kostova, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002) 
including what constitutes socially responsible behavior.  
I also relate institutional distance to another firm characteristic that has been 
found to have a relationship to social responsibility: international scope. Greater 
international scope has been linked to higher levels of overall firm social responsibility 
(Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Kang, 2013; 
Kennelly & Lewis, 2002; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006). I hypothesize and find that 
greater average formal institutional distance within the MNE’s portfolio will moderate 
the social responsibility benefits associated with greater international scope and argue 
that the absorptive capacity developed through greater experience enables firms from 
high CSR countries to more readily build upon and leverage their prior knowledge in 
lower-standard environments (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). To reflect and maintain its 
hierarchical nature, formal institutional distance is conceptualized asymmetrically, and 
the sign/direction of formal distance is retained in the measurement model and analysis. 
The results, tested using multiple hierarchical regressions on a sample of 408 firms 
headquartered throughout Europe, Asia, and North America, support the hypothesis: 
greater formal and informal institutional distance between the MNE’s portfolio of 
locations impacts CSP. 
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Paper 2, “Formal and Informal Corruption Environments and Multinational 
Enterprise Social Irresponsibility”, also explores the institutional environment of MNEs 
and social responsibility, but from a different perspective. This study looks at the 
institutional influences of corruption on firms’ corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). 
CSiR is more than just a lack of CSR (Lange & Washburn, 2012). CSiR reflects a 
specific action that “negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate 
claims” (Strike, et al., 2006).  
Consistent with institutional theory (North, 1990), I conceptualize the institution 
of corruption as having both a formal and informal component. This conceptualization 
considers not only public sector corruption levels (formal corruption environment), but 
also the permeation of corruption into the general culture (informal corruption 
environment). I hypothesize and find that operating in portfolios of locations with greater 
formal and/or informal corruption environments leads MNEs to have higher levels of 
social irresponsibility.  
Furthermore, I investigate the normative aspects of firm social irresponsibility by 
exploring the relationship between CSiR and firm performance. Irresponsible behavior 
may expose a firm to pressures from both private (e.g. non-governmental organization) 
and public (e.g. regulatory) constituents, requiring actions and resources to address the 
irresponsible behavior and stakeholder harm. Not only can reacting to irresponsibility be 
a drain on firm resources, but a pattern of socially irresponsible actions may put the 
firm’s legitimacy with its stakeholders at risk. Therefore I hypothesize and find that firms 
with higher CSiR will be outperformed by more socially responsible firms that do not 
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have to contend with these added risks and costs. My hypotheses are tested and supported 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression on a sample of 699 MNEs. 
With one empirical study examining MNE institutional distance and corporate 
social performance and a second study exploring the institution of corruption and MNE 
social irresponsibility and related firm performance, the two studies individually 
contribute to what we know about social responsibility in an international context and 
together can help us better understand the complex institutional environments of MNEs 
and social responsibility outcomes. It has been noted that “institutions matter” to business 
strategy (Peng, Sunny, Pinkham, & Hao, 2009, p. 65). This dissertation’s findings help us 
better understand how institutional environments can matter to MNE social 
responsibility-related strategy. The results provide specific guidance related to country 
selection and social responsibility strategy for MNE managers concerned about 
maintaining high CSP and minimizing incidents of CSiR. Selecting countries that 
minimize formal and informal institutional distance as well as formal and informal 
corruption environments can reduce the negative impact to firm social responsibility-
related outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 2 (Paper 1) 
THE IMPACT OF MNE PORTFOLIO FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Abstract 
Does country selection affect the corporate social performance (CSP) of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs)? In this study I argue that greater diversity within an 
MNE’s operating environment may adversely affect its ability to maintain higher levels 
of CSP. Using institutional distance as my theoretical lens, I investigate the impact of 
institutional differences on CSP. Following prior international business studies, I 
conceptualize the MNE as a unique portfolio of locations and use the MNE’s entire 
operating footprint to explore the effects of average portfolio formal and informal 
institutional distances on CSP. I hypothesize and find that firms with greater average 
informal institutional distance within their portfolios have lower overall levels of CSP. 
Findings also confirm that due to absorptive capacity and the asymmetric nature of 
formal institutional distance, greater average formal institutional distance within the 
MNE portfolio moderates the CSP benefits of international scope.  
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social performance (CSP), 
institutional theory, institutional distance, multinational enterprise (MNE), portfolio, 
absorptive capacity
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INTRODUCTION 
Social responsibility recognizes that a firm’s stakeholder expectations extend 
beyond purely economic obligations to include certain social and environmental 
responsibilities (Campbell, 2007). Corporate social performance (CSP) represents an 
aggregated view of the degree to which a firm has employed socially responsible 
principles, processes, policies, and programs and achieved associated observable social 
outcomes (Wood, 1991). The availability and transparency of tangible CSP information 
helps investors, consumers, communities, and other stakeholders better understand and 
compare the social performance of firms (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009). 
CSP assessments can have important consequences for businesses. Chatterji et al. 
(2009) point out that the largest retirement fund in the U.S.,TIAA-CREF, sold over $50 
million in Coca-Cola stock in 2006 after one CSP rating agency downgraded Coca-Cola’s 
social responsibility score. Research investigating the relationship between CSP ratings 
and stock prices has found that removal from social responsibility stock indices can have 
a detrimental impact on firm stock price, and strong CSP ratings can minimize these 
negative effects (Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010). Aided by a growing public 
interest and visibility, CSP remains a topic of strategic relevance to both practitioners and 
academics (Carroll & Shabana, 2010).  
Existing CSP research tends to concentrate on domestic issues and contexts, as 
confirmed by a recent systematic review of the management literature (Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012). Even within international management journals, more than half of the 
empirical social responsibility studies are purely domestic in nature (Egri & Ralston, 
2008). However, prior research has confirmed that greater international scope can lead to 
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higher CSP (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; 
Kang, 2013; Kennelly & Lewis, 2002; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006).  
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may face particular challenges in maintaining 
high levels of CSP due in part to the diversity of their operating environments (Mohan, 
2006). As Campbell points out, CSP “may mean different things in different places to 
different people and at different times” (2007, p. 950). This variation in attitudes may be 
exhibited in a wide range of externally-driven pressures related to socially responsible 
business practices across countries (Matten & Moon, 2008). Host country CSP 
expectations may conflict with well-established home country norms and standards or 
require the MNE to develop new capabilities and resources (Arthaud-Day, 2005). Such 
conflicts/differences may influence MNE host country selection or the impact of host 
country selection on CSP perceptions. 
Despite this potential conflict, much of the prior international CSP research 
focuses on firms’ home-country characteristics (Gjolberg, 2009; Ho, Wang, & Vitell, 
2012; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Ringov & Zollo, 2007; 
Waldman, de Luque, Washburn, & House, 2006). This results in at least two 
shortcomings relevant to the exploration of CSP in the multi-country context of MNEs.  
First, while prior research has looked at home country influences on firm CSP, 
prior research has not yet investigated how differences between MNE’s headquarters and 
subsidiary country choices affect overall CSP. Prior empirical research has failed to 
consider that key differences between specific countries for MNEs operating in variety of 
home/host country environments might be an antecedent of social responsibility-themed 
outcomes. This study is the first to examine directly the role that multiple home and host 
country environmental differences have on overall CSP for MNEs. 
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Second, MNEs are a portfolio of investments (Nachum & Song, 2011). Each 
MNE creates its own unique operational portfolio based on its chosen combination of 
operating countries. Research has not yet looked at how key characteristics of the total 
portfolio of an MNE might influence its CSP. Examinations that are limited to a 
particular subset of locations can result in an incomplete view of potentially relevant 
stakeholder influences.  
As MNEs diversify internationally they may face a variety of new regulatory and 
cultural expectations in the foreign operating environments into which they are 
expanding (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Mohan, 2006). This may include 
specific expectations related to social responsibility (Campbell, 2007). To fully examine 
a firm’s overall CSP requires consideration of the cumulative environmental 
heterogeneity from all of its home and foreign operating locations. Taken as a whole, 
prior research has not yet helped MNE managers understand how the integration of 
particular countries into their operational scope might positively or negatively affect their 
CSP. This represents a potentially significant problem for firms that have identified high 
CSP as a strategic imperative.  
Following prior international business researchers (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; 
Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & Meyer, 2009; Holmes Jr, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2012; Peng, 
Sunny, Pinkham, & Hao, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008), I use an institutional theory 
perspective developed by North (1990) and theorize that both formal and informal 
institutional distance within the MNE’s portfolio of locations can influence the firm’s 
CSP. Institutions represent the “rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3). These 
“rules” encompass formal constraints and regulations as well as informal culturally-
influenced behavioral norms and conventions. Each country represents a unique 
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combination of institutional elements (Kogut, 1991). Institutional distance describes 
similarities or differences between institutional elements in different countries (Kostova, 
1999), and larger institutional distances increase risk and uncertainty, making it more 
difficult for firms to effectively operate across diverse countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
In addition in this paper I draw upon a paradigm from the international business 
literature that conceptualizes the MNE as a unique portfolio of locations (Chao & Kumar, 
2010; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997; Kim & 
Park, 2002; Nachum & Song, 2011; Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011). This portfolio 
perspective incorporates the entire set of subsidiary locations which comprise the MNE’s 
operating portfolio, resulting in a more holistic consideration of the variety of 
environmental influences potentially affecting firm CSP. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that greater informal institutional distances in the 
portfolio of countries in which an MNE is collectively operating negatively influence the 
firm’s CSP. Because informal institutional pressures are driven largely by culture (Peng, 
et al., 2008), and each country represents a unique set of national cultural attributes 
(Hofstede, 1980), firms entering new countries are faced with new informal institutional 
expectations for which their prior experience has not necessarily prepared them. The 
greater the differences between home and host cultures, the greater the difficulties a firm 
can expect in learning and meeting the unique local expectations (Kostova, 1999; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002) as to what constitutes socially responsible behavior. 
I also hypothesize that formal institutional distance in the MNE location portfolio, 
reflecting differences in codified expectations, rules, and standards affects firm CSP. In 
this regard the formal institutional distance is theorized to be asymmetric. I hypothesize 
that the positive CSP benefits of international expansion (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 
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2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Kang, 2013; Strike, et al., 2006) are 
moderated by formal institutional distance.  
I propose that an MNE expanding into countries with significantly higher formal 
institutional social responsibility standards than its home country will obtain less of an 
increase in CSP than an MNE expanding into countries with standards that are more 
similar to (or lower than) its home country standard. This moderating impact occurs 
because absorptive capacity developed through experience enables firms from high CSP 
countries to more readily build upon and leverage their prior knowledge in lower-
standard environments (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
In contrast, firms from lower CSP countries will have more difficulties in building 
upon their prior experience to fully absorb and apply the learning associated with 
increased international scope in higher CSP locations. These firms will not realize the full 
CSP benefits from the organizational learning associated with increased scope. I tested 
and confirmed my portfolio distance hypotheses on a sample of 408 firms headquartered 
throughout Europe, Asia, and North America. 
My study contributes to a growing understanding of the antecedents of social 
responsibility in an international context by exploring how formal and informal 
institutional differences within an MNE’s portfolio of location selections can affect the 
firm’s social responsibility outcomes. I suggest that stakeholders in different countries 
may expect varying socially responsible practices for firms operating within their 
borders. Based on this logic I propose that an MNE’s overall CSP postures can be 
expected to be influenced by the differences inherent in its entire location portfolio, not 
just its headquarters country. Thus, I take a holistic view of the MNE and consider the 
impact of its unique portfolio of investment choices on its CSP results.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Prior international CSP research has recognized a relationship between greater 
international scope of experience and the social and environmental performance of MNEs 
(Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Kang, 2013; 
Kennelly & Lewis, 2002; Strike, et al., 2006). Researchers provide two possible 
explanations for these results.  
One explanation is rooted in organizational learning and the resource-based view 
of the firm. Organizational learning may be accelerated as firms expand internationally 
because they are exposed to different ideas from diverse contexts (Chang, 1995; Hitt, 
Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). “Learning is fostered 
by diversity in experience” (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998, p. 7). Because each foreign 
environment in which the firm is operating may reflect different sets of social and 
cultural expectations (McWilliams, et al., 2006; Mohan, 2006), social responsibility in an 
international context can foster development of new knowledge and capabilities which 
the firm can then deploy and leverage (Bansal, 2005; Kennelly & Lewis, 2002). Greater 
international experience and diversification, therefore, provides enhanced opportunities 
for organizational learning and adaptation, which in turn can lead to higher levels of firm 
social performance (Strike, et al., 2006).  
A second related explanation for why greater international scope has been found 
to lead to higher levels of CSP is attributed to influences in the MNE’s institutional 
environment and the firm’s associated drive for legitimacy with local stakeholders. Firms 
with greater international experience may have a heightened general awareness of the 
relative importance of social and environmental responsibility in local markets, helping to 
offset their liabilities of foreignness (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Roth, 2000). The pursuit of 
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local legitimacy can lead firms to expend the resources and take tangible actions 
necessary to increase their local social responsibility credibility and visibility (Bansal & 
Hunter, 2003). More internationally-experienced firms will be better equipped to assess 
and respond to local expectations, but they will also have to make a greater effort to 
maintain their local legitimacy across diverse environments (Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-
Falcon, 2002). 
Other international CSP research has examined how national characteristics of 
MNE home countries may account for different levels of firm social responsibility 
investment and results (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). For example, an examination of 
national political-economic systems found that nations characterized as welfare states, 
with high instances of corporatist arrangements, and those with highly political cultures 
exhibited higher standards of social responsibility (Gjolberg, 2009). Likewise, Matten 
and Moon (2008) contend that differences in national business systems can explain 
differences in firm CSP, encompassing much of the variation between firms 
headquartered in the United States and Europe. In support of this line of thinking, 
Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) compared firms headquartered in more coordinated 
market economies (e.g. continental Europe) and firms from more liberal Anglo Saxon-
based market economies (e.g. United Kingdom) and empirically found that the degree of 
institutionalized coordination amongst home country stakeholders has a negative 
influence on the firm’s level of social responsibility.  
Multiple studies have also confirmed a variety of sometimes conflicting 
relationships between national culture attributes of firm headquarters countries and firm 
CSP. Utilizing both Hofstede (1980) and GLOBE (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 
2002) scales of national culture, Ringov and Zollo (2007) performed an analysis of 457 
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global firms and found that firms headquartered in countries with high power distance 
and masculinity had lower CSP. Using a broad set of firms from 49 different countries, 
Ho, Wang, and Vitell (2012) found linkages between all four core Hofstede (1980) 
national culture attributes of the headquarters country and firm CSP. Waldman, de 
Luque, Washburn, and House’s (2006) comprehensive survey of 561 firms headquartered 
in 15 different countries analyzed national culture as it affects individual leaders’ values 
and attitudes and found that managers’ home country power distance and individualism 
measures were again related to a devaluation of social responsibility. On the other hand, 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) found that both power distance and individualism were 
related to higher levels of CSP.  
In summary, prior research has confirmed a positive relationship between MNE 
international scope and social performance and has also established that home country 
characteristics can be relevant to firm social responsibility attitudes, strategies, and 
outcomes. Taken as a whole, however, these studies do not consider how differences in 
the institutional environment between countries that comprise the MNE’s international 
scope might influence firm CSP. Additionally, they do not consider CSP from the 
institutional context of the MNE’s entire portfolio of locations. 
 
Institutional Distance and Corporate Social Performance 
Institutional theory suggests firms rely upon institutional cues in their external 
environments to identify accepted and expected behavior and to establish legitimacy in 
their markets (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). These external influences take 
the form of formal rules and informal constraints (North, 1990). Formal institutions 
include laws, regulations, and other codified societal constraints. They are explicit in 
29 
 
nature and can be measured and enforced by regulatory bodies. Formal institutions are 
complemented by informal institutions, which provide additional structure and help 
further reduce uncertainty by filling the gaps where there are no formalized institutional 
guidelines for expected behavior. Typically not codified (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), 
informal institutions are transmitted socially and reflect behavioral norms, cultural 
standards, and related codes of conduct.  
Each country has its own unique institutional environment (Kogut, 1991), and 
institutional distance is used to represent the difference between the institutional 
profiles of different countries (Kostova, 1999). Home-host country differences may 
make it more difficult for firms to effectively operate across countries (Xu & Shenkar, 
2002). A large institutional distance may represent a challenge for firms to overcome as 
they seek to establish legitimacy and adapt their domestic practices to a foreign market 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). This becomes even more important 
and difficult for MNEs who must balance multiple (potentially conflicting) foreign 
institutional environments and expectations as they seek host country legitimization 
(Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). 
Institutional distance is often conceptualized as cultural distance, a method of 
representing the cultural similarity or difference between countries that has become a 
staple in international business research (Shenkar, 2001). A larger cultural distance 
introduces a degree of incremental complexity and uncertainty, increasing risk (Shane, 
Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1995). One of the advantages of institutional distance over 
purely culturally-based distance is that institutional distance can encompass both 
regulatory (formal) and cultural (informal) institutional components. Thus, according to 
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Berry et al., an institutionally-grounded approach to distance is preferable to a purely 
cultural view of distance because it can incorporate an additional dimension (2010).  
Large institutional differences between countries can create a liability of 
foreignness that must be overcome to optimize performance in new markets (Zaheer, 
1995). CSP may be affected by liability of foreignness issues because: (1) what 
constitutes socially responsible behavior can vary significantly between countries 
(Campbell, 2007; Mohan, 2006); and (2) CSP is socially constructed and context-
dependent (Ringov & Zollo, 2007).  
Despite a call for research attention to better understanding the institutional 
antecedents of corporate social responsibility (Campbell, 2007), I have been able to find 
only two published articles to date which examine the influence of institutional distance 
on any kind of social responsibility outcome. The first study (Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 
2012) explored the contention that greater headquarters-subsidiary distance motivates 
firms to invest in social responsibility as a means of overcoming their liabilities of 
foreignness.  
Using lending practice ratings of foreign bank subsidiaries in the U.S. (above, 
below, or on par with U.S. standards) as a proxy for social responsibility, the researchers 
applied a series of home-host distance measures inspired by Ghemawat’s (2001) CAGE 
framework. The findings indicate that cultural, administrative (regulatory), geographic, 
and economic distances all have negative impacts on affiliate bank lending, and some 
negative effects of distance can be offset by positive firm social responsibility reputation.  
Although this study helps shed light on the impact of distance on lending 
practices, it has the limitation of being focused on the dyadic relationships between sets 
of headquarters-U.S. subsidiary locations only. Thus, my study provides a much more 
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comprehensive treatment of social responsibility and distance. It does so by examining 
the entire MNE portfolio of locations across multiple host countries (rather than specific 
dyads and a single host country) and by considering the firm’s overall CSP (rather than a 
specific practice, such as lending). 
A second study examined the standardization of MNE environmental practices to 
determine whether firms benefit from smaller institutional distances as a way of gaining 
local social responsibility legitimacy and a resource-based competitive advantage 
(Aguilera-Caracuel, Aragón-Correa, Hurtado-Torres, & Rugman, 2012). Tests of 210 
MNE headquarters-subsidiary dyads spanning five home and host countries indicate that 
lower environmental institutional distances are positively related to firm environmental 
practice standardization.  
Once again these findings were based only upon specific and artificially limited 
dyads of headquarters and subsidiaries rather than the entire operating “footprint” of the 
MNE. Additionally, because the research question involved only five countries and one 
particular subset of the broad topic of social responsibility (environmental 
standardization), the findings have limited generalizability when it comes to predicting 
overall firm CSP results. While Aguilera-Carcuel et al. (2012) and Campbell et al. (2012) 
do offer some initial insights into potential relationships between institutional distance 
and MNE environmental responsibility, neither study examines overall firm CSP nor do 
either of these studies consider the social responsibility impacts of the MNE’s entire 
location footprint.  
Thus, research has not yet applied the concept of institutional distance to the study 
of MNE social performance. No study to date has considered how institutional distance 
measured across the entire portfolio of an MNE influences its overall CSP. Yet 
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understanding the dynamics associated with social responsibility results requires 
consideration of how home and host country influences may interact to affect firm social 
responsibility strategies and outcomes (Jamali, 2010). Therefore my research model (as 
indicated in Figure 2.1) draws a distinction between formal and informal institutional 
distances that is consistent with institutional theory’s framework of formal rules and 
informal constraints (North, 1990). Below I develop and test a theory of MNE portfolio 
institutional distance and CSP. 
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FIGURE 2.1. Conceptual research model  
 
Informal Institutional Distance and CSP 
Informal institutions represent “codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and 
conventions” (North, 1990, p. 36), informal constraints are closely related to culture, and 
national culture is commonly used as a proxy measure for informal institutions (Dikova, 
2009; Peng, et al., 2008; Redding, 2005; Singh, 2007). Informal institutional distance, 
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therefore, reflects the similarity or dissimilarity between countries’ cultural environments 
(Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
As firms diversify internationally into new host countries, they face new informal 
institutional environments based on unique country histories, cultures and social norms. 
Although learning about any new host country cultural environment takes time 
(Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008), the larger the informal institutional 
distance between a firm’s headquarters and subsidiary locations, the greater the 
difficulties the firm can expect in terms of learning the new subsidiary country culture 
and its associated standards and behavioral norms (Kostova, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
One possible reason why firms accept the additional responsibilities associated 
with social responsibility is that they are driven by the cultural influences of the countries 
in which they are operating (Park, Russell, & Lee, 2007; Ringov & Zollo, 2007; 
Waldman, et al., 2006). Local market informal social norms will reflect certain social 
responsibility expectations, and exhibiting locally-appropriate socially responsible 
behavior is becoming increasingly important to the local legitimization of MNEs (Matten 
& Moon, 2008). Because of this, firms may face CSP consequences (either positive or 
negative) based on the cultural distinctiveness of their target market compared to their 
home market (Peters & Vassar, 2009). Firms operating in countries that are highly 
culturally different from their home country may find themselves at a disadvantage in 
terms of CSP results.  
Additionally, firm CSP may be affected by related informal institutional 
pressures exerted by external organizations in the foreign operating environments that 
can drive the MNE’s conformance to certain social performance standards and practices 
(Campbell, 2007). Local and industry social values and norms regarding social 
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responsibility expectations may be reflected in the actions of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other private, independent organizations (Delmas & Toffel, 
2004) such as “watch dog” and activist groups.  
Industry trade associations in host countries may actively promote social and 
environmental agendas with their members (Fox, 2004). Corporate managers may be 
influenced by the messages and mindsets that are promoted in local professional 
publications and business education (Campbell, 2007). All of these represent potential 
social responsibility-relevant informal institutional forces that can vary between 
countries. 
The informal institutional differences between countries can be particularly 
important to MNEs, because they may have to navigate a variety of informal institutional 
environments via their operations in multiple countries. Thus, MNEs are comprised of a 
portfolio of different country selections (Nachum & Song, 2011), with each subsidiary 
location representing a corresponding institutional distance from the home country. A 
portfolio-level informal institutional distance for the firm can be represented by 
averaging the informal institutional distances between the home country and each of the 
MNE subsidiary location countries (Chao & Kumar, 2010). In this aggregated form, I 
expect the average portfolio informal institutional distance to have a negative effect on 
overall firm CSP; the greater the average difference in cultures, the greater this impact is 
expected to be for the following reasons.  
First, greater informal institutional distance reflects a higher degree of ambiguity 
for the firm. Informal institutions are not standardized or formalized; they represent tacit 
social conventions and codes of conduct (North, 1990). Because informal institutions 
lack codification, when informal institutional distance within the firm’s portfolio is 
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greater, the firm can expect to face more uncertainty in terms of clearly understanding 
what is expected by each local market. This ambiguity can limit the firm’s ability to 
recognize different unstated informal institutional expectations and priorities, further 
compromising their ability to reconcile and respond appropriately in terms of social 
responsibility innovations.  
Second, large informal institutional distances may represent greater stakeholder 
diversity, increasing complexity for the firm. Informal institutions are driven largely by 
culture. Although two countries may share certain similar national culture attributes, each 
country ultimately represents a unique combination of cultural attributes (Hofstede, 
1980). Thus, a larger informal institutional distance between the MNE’s headquarters and 
portfolio of subsidiary locations equates to a greater degree of potential diversity in terms 
of how the firm’s stakeholders define a socially responsible enterprise. Stakeholder 
considerations are the “cornerstone” of social responsibility (Barnett, 2007, p. 796). 
However, the more diverse the set of stakeholders to which the MNE is beholden, the 
more likely the scenario that one set of firm stakeholder’s expectations will conflict with 
another, resulting in potential trade-off problems that can ultimately hurt the firm’s CSP 
(Barnett, 2007). 
Third, because every culture is unique, MNE experience with the social 
responsibility expectations of one country may not directly transfer to another. Each 
country has a unique history, culture, and customs, and firm experience with one 
country’s informal institutions typically does not translate into understanding the 
informal institutions of a second country, even if the countries are geographically 
adjacent. For this reason, experience in one country does not necessarily automatically 
translate to ready-experience in another country (O'Grady & Lane, 1996). For example, 
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although the cultural profile of the U.S. is relatively similar to the profiles of other native 
English-speaking countries, there are distinct differences in transacting business in 
Canada, Australia, or the United Kingdom vs. the U.S. Firms must gain specific 
experience with each country in which they operate. Developing these capabilities 
requires more effort when the cultural distance to be overcome represents a larger gap.  
Finally, MNE subsidiaries may find that culturally-driven informal institutional 
influences of their portfolio of subsidiary markets conflict with internal institutionalized 
expectations of the parent company. Institutional duality recognizes that MNEs are faced 
with the challenge of both obtaining legitimacy with their external (host country) 
environments and also maintaining it internally within the firm (and its home country 
environment) (Kostova & Roth, 2002). While the firm may value enterprise-level 
operating consistency based on home country standards, the subsidiary may be drawn 
toward actions which drive local acceptance (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Local host 
culture social responsibility expectations may be left unfulfilled or contradicted as the 
subsidiary succumbs to the legitimate practices of the parent company (Jamali & Neville, 
2011). The greater the diversity between home and host cultures, the more likely this type 
of violation may take place.  
 An example can help illustrate why larger informal institutional distances may 
negatively affect firm CSP. Consider the case of a hypothetical MNE headquartered in 
China with subsidiary locations in northern European countries, such as Sweden and 
Norway. The cultural profile of China, characterized by extremely high power distance, 
masculinity, and collectivism, is vastly different than Sweden and Norway, both of which 
are low power distance, highly feminine, and individualistic cultures (Hofstede, 1980).  
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 The average informal institutional distance within this firm’s portfolio is 
therefore expected to be relatively high, resulting in higher degrees of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Detecting and fully understanding the tacit requirements in terms of what 
comprise legitimate levels of social responsibility in the northern European market may 
be more difficult for the Chinese MNE compared to firms from countries more culturally 
similar to Sweden and Norway. Furthermore, once recognized, these new requirements 
will have to be reconciled with the MNE’s home-country norms, inevitably requiring 
further investment in learning and response strategies. These dynamics may strain the 
limited resources and focus of the MNE and increase the likelihood that the firm’s overall 
CSP may suffer as a result. 
In contrast, consider a U.S.-based MNE with subsidiary locations in Australia. 
Australia has a very similar cultural profile to the U.S., resulting in a relatively lower 
average portfolio informal institutional distance for this firm. Although the U.S. firm still 
has to learn Australia’s idiosyncratic expectations related to social responsibility, because 
of the cultural similarities, the differences are not expected to be as dramatic in terms of 
recognition, reconciliation, and response. There is a high likelihood that many of the 
firm’s current strategies to satisfy the informal institutional expectations of the U.S. 
market will satisfy the culturally similar Australian subsidiary locations. Because there is 
less ambiguity and less uncertainty inherent in its mix of countries, the informal 
institutional distance in this firm’s portfolio is not expected to drag down the MNE’s 
overall CSP.  
Therefore, multiple factors may lead MNEs with higher average informal 
institutional distance within their subsidiary portfolios to experience lower overall firm 
CSP. The tacit nature of informal institutions makes them difficult to recognize and fully 
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understand in host environments that vary significantly from the home culture. MNEs 
with wider diversity in informal stakeholder expectations may have to make tough 
choices when one stakeholder’s claim conflicts with another’s, and firm CSP may suffer 
as a result. Overcoming limitations in transferability of prior country experience due to 
the cultural uniqueness of new country environments taxes a firm’s resources, as does 
resolving potential conflicts associated with external-internal institutional duality. For 
these reasons, I suggest that the difficulty in recognizing, reconciling, and responding to 
different informal institutional profiles of culturally diverse operating environments can 
result in lower CSP for the MNE. Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: An MNE with higher average informal institutional distance within 
its operating portfolio will have lower CSP (than an MNE with lower average 
informal institutional distance). 
 
 
Formal Institutional Distance, International Scope, and CSP  
Although previous research has found that greater international scope can lead to 
higher CSP (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; 
Kang, 2013; Kennelly & Lewis, 2002; Strike, et al., 2006), I propose that this effect will 
be moderated by the distance between formal institutions in the MNE’s headquarters and 
portfolio of subsidiaries. Formal institutions reflect regulatory expectations and 
conventions formally embedded within the structures of a society (North, 1990). Formal 
institutions in a firm’s operating environment can influence social responsibility 
investment decisions and outcomes. Firms may face increased (decreased) regulatory 
pressures including stakeholder monitoring requirements related to social responsibility 
compliance (Matten & Moon, 2008), such as in environmental and labor practices, as 
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they expand abroad. Such regulatory-related formal institutional pressures can have an 
impact on firm CSP (Campbell, 2007).  
Formal institutional distance describes differences in the formal institutional 
environments between countries. In this study I focus on the national standards of social 
responsibility in each country as a relevant representation of formal institutional 
differences. Examining the relative social responsibility standards of different countries 
highlights a wide variation in formal institutional environments faced by MNEs. Not all 
countries necessarily value or require the same levels of CSP from the firms operating 
within their borders (Campbell, 2007). International firms are therefore faced with the 
challenge of reconciling differing formalized social responsibility standards for each host 
country market in which they have a presence. Firms must determine when to adapt to 
local formal CSP expectations, recognizing some host country CSP standards may 
conflict with or be beyond the home country-driven capabilities of the firm (Arthaud-
Day, 2005).  
I conceptualize formal institutional distance in this study as being asymmetric. 
One weakness of prior distance research is that distance is too commonly conceived to be 
an absolute value or squared difference between two points (Shenkar, 2001; Zaheer, 
Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012). Institutional distance from Country A to Country B is 
typically treated as equivalent to the distance from Country B to A. This study moves 
beyond this non-directional dyadic view and instead considers the actual difference 
between the CSP standards of the MNE’s portfolio subsidiary location countries as 
compared to its home country in such a way as to maintain directionality in the formal 
distance measurement.  
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Because some countries have high CSP standards and other countries have 
relatively lower CSP standards, the resulting portfolio formal institutional distance of a 
given MNE can be a positive number or a negative number. A MNE headquartered in a 
country with a lower CSP standard than its subsidiary portfolio countries could face a 
very large (positive) formal institutional distance. In contrast, a MNE headquartered in a 
country with higher CSP standards than its average subsidiary portfolio can be expected 
to have a very small or negative formal institutional distance with which to contend.  
When a MNE enters markets with higher CSP formal institutional standards, the 
firm may need to develop new skills related to social responsibility strategy and 
implementation. These new skills might include the firm having to learn to manage 
complex country-specific regulations, maintain multiple governmental relationships, 
and/or learn to reconcile home- and host-country CSP standard differences (Strike, et al., 
2006). Through experience MNEs develop or acquire the needed resources and 
capabilities to meet the specific formal institutional expectations of their target operating 
locations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Prior research has therefore confirmed a positive 
relationship between international scope and firm CSP (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 
2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Kang, 2013; Kennelly & Lewis, 2002; Strike, 
et al., 2006).  
These positive CSP benefits related to international scope may be moderated by 
the formal institutional distance between the MNE’s headquarters and subsidiary 
portfolio countries. The reason for this is that larger (positive) formal institutional 
distances represent a gap between the MNE’s subsidiary CSP expectations and 
headquarters CSP knowledge, making it difficult for the firm to understand and 
internalize a more diverse set of (higher) formal institutional requirements.  
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When the new knowledge the firm is presented with is highly institutionally 
different from (represented by a greater formal institutional distance) the firm’s 
headquarters standards, the firm may struggle in understanding, absorbing, and applying 
the new knowledge. The firm will still get some of the CSP benefits associated with 
increased international scope, but not necessarily the full benefit as international scope 
CSP researchers assume.  
Some of the benefit will be lost through the challenges of absorptive capacity. 
Absorptive capacity refers to the “ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). It enables 
firms to learn new things related to things they have already mastered (Lane, Koka, & 
Pathak, 2006). As firms learn more in a specific domain (e.g. social responsibility) and 
increase their base of knowledge and become more absorptive related to that domain, 
they are subsequently better positioned to leverage and continue to build upon that 
knowledge and domain (Zahra & George, 2002).  
Absorptive capacity develops cumulatively, building on prior knowledge. When a 
firm is presented with new external knowledge that is very different from its base of prior 
experience (as in the case of a MNE facing new, higher CSP standards in its host 
countries), this large difference can become a limiting factor in the firm’s ability to fully 
assimilate and exploit the new knowledge (Lane, et al., 2006). 
Because of the hierarchical nature of formal institutions, once a firm has 
successfully obtained a given level of capability that meets social responsibility pressures 
in one country, the firm is able to apply and leverage this capability in subsequent 
country expansions. If the firm has met the world’s most stringent CSP standard, it can 
more easily meet less stringent country standards. Formal institutional experience can 
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transfer from one country to another, if the MNE’s experiential scope is at least as 
stringent as the new country’s requirements.  
When a firm incorporates countries into its location portfolio that result in a small 
(or negative) formal institutional distance absorptive capacity will be less of a challenge; 
the requirements are much more similar to the firm’s prior experience and knowledge. 
Small (or negative) portfolio formal institutional distances are expected to have a 
negligible effect and will not erode the CSP benefits of increased international scope; 
such new knowledge can be absorbed and transformed into new knowledge and 
capability more easily.  
In contrast, an MNE with a portfolio of locations that results in a large (positive) 
portfolio formal institutional distance will receive less of a CSP benefit from its 
international scope than the firm operating in the same number of countries but having a 
small (or negative) portfolio formal institutional distance. The large (positive) portfolio 
formal institutional distance reflects external CSP expectations that exceed the MNE’s 
home country standards, representing a lack of knowledge complementarity with the 
firm’s prior experience, affecting the firm’s ability to absorb, integrate, and apply the 
external knowledge associated with the different (higher) social responsibility standards 
(Pinkse, Kuss, & Hoffmann, 2010). When the MNE’s portfolio of locations has an 
average formal institutional standard that exceeds the home country standards, the firm 
faces additional challenges in applying its previously obtained knowledge to recognizing 
and responding to unfamiliar (higher) host country expectations.  
For instance, Swedish environmental regulations can be extremely stringent, 
ensuring the lowest environmental impact from manufacturing (e.g. nine out of a possible 
10). In contrast, in some areas of Asia there may be only limited environmental 
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guidelines (e.g. two out of 10) or even no specific requirements at all. The extreme 
simplified example of a firm headquartered in China with all of its subsidiaries located in 
Sweden would therefore have an average portfolio formal institutional distance that is a 
high (large positive) number (9 – 2 = 7).  
The opposite hypothetical firm headquartered in Sweden with all subsidiaries in 
China would have a very small (actually a large negative) portfolio formal institutional 
distance (2 – 9 = -7). Prior research has confirmed that both of these firms can expect to 
see some CSP benefits associated with their international scope (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & 
Hunter, 2003; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Kang, 2013; Kennelly & Lewis, 
2002; Strike, et al., 2006). The first firm faces a greater hurdle because its portfolio of 
subsidiary locations have higher average social responsibility standards than the firm’s 
home country standards, as reflected by the larger formal institutional distance. This firm 
will still see CSP improvements from the organizational learning associated with 
international expansion. Due to absorptive capacity the first firm will see fewer CSP 
improvements because of the larger formal institutional distance that it must overcome; 
this firm has more learning to do and more obstacles to overcome. The social 
responsibility standards of the second firm’s home location already far exceed the 
subsidiary portfolio’s average social responsibility expectations; therefore, the second 
firm will see very little erosion in the CSP benefits it receives from international scope.  
Prior research has assumed that as an MNE expands its international scope, the 
more it will learn from the new country environments, subsequently leading to an 
increase in firm knowledge and CSP. However, in some instances the learning (and 
subsequent CSP benefit) may be less than the international scope alone predicts. This is 
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due to the hierarchical nature of formal institutions and the firm’s absorptive capacity for 
learning.  
When a MNE’s home country formal institutional standard exceeds the 
corresponding average standard of its portfolio of locations, the firm is readily able to 
leverage its absorptive capacity in learning and adapting to new requirements; they are 
more similar in nature to the firm’s prior experience and knowledge. When the MNE’s 
portfolio of locations has an average formal institutional standard that exceeds the home 
country standards, the firm faces additional challenges in applying its previously obtained 
knowledge to recognizing and responding to unfamiliar (higher) host country 
expectations. Greater average formal institutional distance inherent within the firm’s 
overall operating portfolio erodes some of the learning benefits associated with increased 
international scope. Thus, I propose that:  
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between a MNE’s international scope and its CSP 
is moderated by the average formal institutional distance in the MNE’s subsidiary 
portfolio such that the benefits of increased international scope are reduced when 
average formal institutional distance is higher.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Few empirical social responsibility studies to date have been truly international 
(Arthaud-Day, 2005; Mohan, 2006). A review of the social responsibility literature found 
only 13% of the 242 empirical CSR studies published in international business journals 
1998-2007 included six or more countries; only 7% used 25 or greater countries (Egri & 
Ralston, 2008). One of the key objectives underpinning my study’s research design is to 
help fill this void by maximizing global coverage, which translates to a desired sample 
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spanning at least 25 different countries in multiple regions of the world. Archival data 
sources are used to ensure the broadest possible country representation. 
The CSRHub sustainability rating database serves as the sample frame for this 
study. As the term “hub” implies, CSRHub is widely used by institutional investors 
because it normalizes and aggregates global information from a wide variety of 
environmental, social, and governance research firms, governmental agencies, and 
NGOs to provide consolidated access to more than 125 sources of information in 
support of socially responsible investment practices for over 5,000 publicly-traded firms 
headquartered in 65 countries.  
I introduce this new dataset that has not previously been used in social 
responsibility research for two reasons. First, CSRHub is a “born global” social 
responsibility ratings service. Unlike the more popular Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
Research & Analytics (KLD, now part of MSCI Inc.) or Fortune Magazine’s “Most 
Admired Companies” ratings, for example, the CSRHub sustainability rating database 
has been comprised of global data from its inception. CSRHub’s global coverage 
includes not only a wide diversity of firm headquarters locations, but it also incorporates 
relevant data points from any/all countries in which that firm is doing business into its 
aggregate measurements. In contrast, the KLD social responsibility dataset, the most 
widely used rating data for social responsibility research purposes, has a distinctly North 
American heritage (Wood, 2010). Although KLD has made in-roads since 2001 toward 
expanded global coverage, over 85% of the almost 3,000 firms available in the 2010-11 
KLD dataset represent US-headquartered firms.  
The second reason for the choice of sample frame is that CSRHub provides open 
public access to a comprehensive and rigorous set of international firm CSP indices. The 
46 
 
proprietary, subscription-based CSP datasets commonly used in research studies, such 
as KLD, are only available to those who can afford to pay for them, representing a 
substantial access barrier. Therefore, CSRHub’s open access format allows a wider 
variety of other researchers to be able to replicate and expand upon my results.  
The sample for this study was randomly selected from the more than 5,600 firms 
available in the CSRHub database. Based on the total number of variables in the 
research model (20) and a desired observation-variable ratio of 20:1 (Hair, Black, Babin, 
& Anderson, 2010, p. 176), a desired sample size of approximately 400 firms was 
targeted for this analysis. To ensure the final sample size threshold would be 
maintained, I randomly selected 450 firms from CSRHub with the expectation that some 
observations would have to be dropped from the sample per missing data. Firms which 
were found to be purely domestic (operating in only one country) or for which complete 
data was unavailable were eliminated from the sample.  
Geographic and industry distribution of the final sample is summarized in Tables 
2.1 and 2.2. The sample was comprised of 408 firms headquartered in all three major 
economic regions: Europe (50%), Asia (30%), and North America (20%). The most 
prevalent headquarters countries are Japan (24.8%), the United Kingdom (16.2%), and 
the United States (15.7%), with a total of 27 different headquarters countries represented 
in the sample. The MNEs in the final sample have operations located in a range from 
two to 106 different countries, with an average of 126 subsidiaries dispersed across an 
average of 20 different countries per firm. The final sample includes a total of 52,897 
firm-location observations. 
Firms from a broad range of both manufacturing and service industries are 
included in the sample. The largest industry sector represented is Industrials (aerospace, 
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construction and engineering services, machinery, commercial and professional 
services, and transportation, comprising 22% of the total sample) followed by 
Financials (banks, financial services, insurance, and real estate, 17%) and Materials 
(industrial components and packaging, construction materials, metals and mining, paper 
and forest products, 16%).  
 
TABLE 2.1. Sample description by headquarters country 
Country Count  Country Count 
Australia 13 (3.2)  Luxembourg 2 (0.5) 
Belgium 4 (1.0)  Malaysia 1 (0.2) 
Canada 18 (4.4)  Netherlands 9 (2.2) 
China 1 (0.2)  Norway 7 (1.7) 
Denmark 5 (1.2)  Poland 1 (0.2) 
Finland 7 (1.7)  Portugal 5 (1.2) 
France 19 (4.7)  Singapore 1 (0.2) 
Germany 21 (5.1)  Spain 11 (2.7) 
Greece 6 (1.5)  Sweden 20 (4.9) 
India 1 (0.2)  Switzerland 12 (2.9) 
Ireland 3 (0.7)  Thailand 1 (0.2) 
Italy 4 (1.0)  United 
Kingdom 
66 (16.2) 
Japan 101 (24.8)  United States 64 (15.7) 
S. Korea 5 (1.2)    
(Percentages of total sample in parentheses) 
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TABLE 2.2. Sample description by industry sector and headquarters region 
Industry Sector Asia Europe N. America Total 
Consumer Discretionary 24 (44) 27 (50) 3 (6) 54 
Consumer Staples  3 (10) 20 (65) 8 (26) 31 
Energy 6 (25) 6 (25) 12 (50) 24 
Financials 16 (23) 41 (58) 14 (20) 71 
Healthcare 6 (32) 6 (32) 7 (37) 19 
Industrials 29 (33) 45 (51) 14 (16) 88 
Information Technology 12 (46) 7 (27) 7 (27) 26 
Materials 23 (34) 32 (48) 12 (18) 67 
Telecommunication Services 1 (11) 7 (78) 1 (1) 9 
Utilities 4 (20) 11 (58) 4 (20) 20 
Total 124 202 82 408 
(Percentages of industry in parentheses) 
 
Dependent Variable 
There are a variety of approaches to measuring firm-level social responsibility 
including firm self-reported data, reputational indexes, and social rating agencies (Wood, 
2010). Social rating agency data minimizes firm self-reporting bias by aggregating data 
from public and surveyed sources. In this study CSP for each firm is measured via the 
overall CSR index obtained from the CSRHub sustainability ratings database. The 2011 
CSRHub overall CSR index is an interval scale numeric score (0 to 100) reflecting the 
overall social responsibility rating for each firm, encompassing four social responsibility 
dimensions: community relations, governance, employee relations, and environmental 
performance. The sub-categories associated with each dimension are summarized in 
Table 2.3. It has been noted, however, that although third-party social responsibility 
ratings, such as CSRHub, remain among the most widely-used types of CSP measures 
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and can be preferable to company self-reported data and reports (Wood, 2010), there is a 
risk that aggregated measures may somewhat mask offsetting data points for a particular 
firm (Mahon & Wartick, 2012). High “overall” CSP should not be construed to mean the 
firm has necessarily achieved high results in all areas of social responsibility (Wood, 
2010). 
The CSRHub overall CSR index is a multidimensional measure incorporating 
distinct scores for the four social responsibility dimensions described in Table 2.3. 
Because the CSRHub dataset has not yet been used in academic research, I performed a 
factor analysis to assess the reliability of the composite CSRHub overall CSR index 
measure per thresholds defined by Hair et al. (2010).  
 
TABLE 2.3. CSRHub social responsibility rating dimensions and sub-categories  
Dimension Sub-categories 
Community Community development and philanthropy 
 Human rights 
 Supply chain 
 Product 
Employees Compensation and benefits 
 Diversity and labor rights 
 Training, safety and health 
Environment Energy and climate change 
 Environment policy and reporting 
 Resource management 
Governance Board of directors 
 Leadership ethics 
 Transparency and reporting 
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Varimax rotation confirmed all four social responsibility dimension scores 
(Community, Employees, Environment, and Governance) loaded on a single factor as 
expected (eigenvalue = 2.498), explaining 62.46% of the variance and producing a 
significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity (p < .001). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (MSA) exceeded the required .50 threshold (.710), and all 
communalities met the recommended .50 rule-of-thumb. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
four items was .797, suggesting an acceptable level of reliability, and the Cronbach’s 
alpha was not improved by the removal of any of the items. All item-to-total 
correlations exceeded the minimum .50 level, and inter-item correlations exceeded the 
recommended .30 threshold. Taken as a whole, these factor analysis results 
(summarized in Table 2.4) provide support for the use of the CSRHub composite overall 
CSR index score to operationalize the dependent variable, CSP, in this study. 
 
TABLE 2.4. Exploratory factor analysis CSRHub Overall CSR Index 
Variable Factor 1 
Community .809 
Governance .773 
Employees .810 
Environment .767 
Eigenvalue 2.498 
 
 
Portfolio-Level Operationalization 
Consistent with recent international business strategy research (Chao & Kumar, 
2010; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997; Kim & Park, 2002; 
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Nachum & Song, 2011; Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011), I conceptualize the MNE as a 
portfolio and average the institutional distance measures at a portfolio level. It is 
relatively rare to find studies which take the MNE’s entire portfolio of locations into 
consideration. It is much more common to see research models which focus on either 1) 
the headquarters locations; or 2) specific dyadic relationships between the headquarters 
location and one other specific location (such as the home-host dyad in associated with a 
foreign entry mode decision). This over-reliance on the home country and/or home-host 
dyad can be limiting, because as the resource-based view of the firm suggests, MNEs 
represent a bundle of resources, capabilities, locations, and knowledge (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Failure to consider the MNE’s full portfolio may result in an 
incomplete or at worst an incorrect perspective regarding the firm. 
To operationalize institutional distances in a way that accounts for the MNE’s 
total operating environment, I adopt a portfolio-level measurement technique established 
in prior international business literature. Portfolio-level measures are constructed by 
aggregating and averaging country-level characteristics or distances across all locations 
that comprise a MNE’s subsidiary portfolio. Each resulting portfolio measure represents a 
weighted average of the country attribute(s) it is measuring, weighted such that multiple 
locations operating in the same country are each included in the portfolio-level average 
calculations. This portfolio measurement technique has been used to evaluate a variety of 
MNE phenomena, including: the target location-to-portfolio fit and country entry/exit 
decisions (Nachum & Song, 2011); the relationship between the geographic distance 
within the MNE’s location portfolio and firm profitability (Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011); 
and the moderating influence of institutional distance within the location portfolio on the 
international diversity-performance relationship. This portfolio measurement approach 
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allows for the formation of firm-specific measurements based on the MNE’s unique 
portfolio of locations (Nachum & Song, 2011). This provides advantages over purely 
dyadic distance calculations. “The adoption of a dyadic perspective would not reveal the 
impact of the benefits and costs of distance aggregated at the level of the firm as a whole 
because of trade-offs and spillovers that may be involved both within and across 
portfolios” (Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011, p. 123). 
 
Independent Variables  
Portfolio informal institutional distance (PIID): As in Xu and Shenkar (2002), 
Informal institutional distance is measured via cultural distance. I differ from their study 
by averaging cultural distance at a portfolio level. To accomplish this, the cultural 
distance between each headquarters-subsidiary dyad is first calculated following the 
widely adopted formula set forth by Kogut and Singh (1988), using four dimensions 
taken from Hofstede’s (1980) national culture scale: power distance, individualism-
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity. The four attribute-level 
dyadic cultural distances are then averaged to arrive at an average overall cultural 
distance for each headquarters-subsidiary pair, again consistent with Kogut and Singh 
(1988). 
Second, following prior international business studies (Chao & Kumar, 2010; 
Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997; Kim & Park, 2002; Nachum & 
Song, 2011; Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011), the distances for all headquarters-subsidiary 
dyads are then averaged to create an overall portfolio-level measure of informal 
institutional distance for the MNE. The firm’s resulting average portfolio informal 
institutional distance represents a weighted average of the cultural distance between all 
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subsidiary countries and the headquarters locations such that multiple subsidiaries 
operating in the same country are each included in the average calculation for the firm. 
The overall measurement of each firm’s portfolio informal institutional distance (PIID) is 
reflected in the following formula: 
PIID Firm = 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 ∑ [
(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝐻𝑄−𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑖)
2
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(2.1) 
where:  
PIIDFirm = The firm’s average Portfolio Informal Institutional Distance 
i = Suffix indicating the different subsidiaries 
NSub = Number of subsidiaries in the firm’s portfolio 
PDIHQ = Hofstede Power Distance value for the firm’s headquarters (HQ) country 
PDIi = Hofstede Power Distance value for the firm’s ith subsidiary’s country 
VarPDI = Variance across all available countries for Hofstede Power Distance values 
INDHQ = Hofstede Individualism-Collectivism value for the firm’s HQ’s country 
INDi = Hofstede Individualism-Collectivism value for the firm’s ith subsidiary’s 
country 
VarIND = Variance across available countries for Hofstede Individualism-Collectivism  
UAIHQ = Hofstede Uncertainty Avoidance value for the firm’s HQ’s country 
UAIi = Hofstede Uncertainty Avoidance value for the firm’s ith subsidiary’s country 
VarUAI = Variance across all available countries for Hofstede Uncertainty Avoidance  
MASHQ = Hofstede Masculinity-Femininity value for the firm’s HQ’s country 
MASi = Hofstede Masculinity-Femininity value for the firm’s ith subsidiary’s country 
VarMAS = Variance across all available countries for Hofstede Masculinity-Femininity 
values 
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Portfolio formal institutional distance (PFID): The Portfolio formal 
institutional distance reflects the differences in regulatory institutional stringency 
between the firm’s subsidiary and headquarters locations. One of the most important 
and tangible areas of formal institutionalized regulation related to corporate social 
responsibility is the environmental dimension (Kolk & Pinkse, 2008). Environmental 
performance is considered one of the foundational pillars in the “triple bottom line” of 
corporate social responsibility (Bansal, 2004) and was one of the earliest areas of firm 
social responsibility explored by researchers, aided by the availability of tangible 
measurements (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Russo & Fouts, 1997) . Because of the 
maturity, measurability, and relevance of environmental performance to MNE CSP, in 
this study I follow Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2012) and measure the formal institutional 
distance of each firm based on country-level environmental performance standards.  
Consistent with prior environmental institutional distance measurements 
(Aguilera-Caracuel, et al., 2012), country-level environmental social responsibility 
standards data is obtained from the World Economic Forum’s 2010 Environmental 
Performance Index (EPI), published by Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy 
and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (Emerson et al., 
2010). The EPI has been subjected to thorough validity testing and has been confirmed 
to provide a reliable country-level comparison of environmental performance reflecting 
the respective stringency and effectiveness of regulatory policies and institutions in 163 
countries (Saisana & Saltelli, 2010). By providing insights into the relative stringency of 
environmental regulatory institutions in a broad range of countries, the EPI is used as 
the basis to measure the formal institutional distance of the MNE’s portfolio of locations 
in this study.  
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To create country-level scores that measure the stringency of environmental 
policy and physical conditions that MNEs may be subjected to, the EPI aggregates 
detailed environmental data points from a wide range of different governmental, 
international organization, NGO, and academic sources. The 10 environmental policy 
categories are tracked via 25 indicators, summarized in Table 2.5.  
 
TABLE 2.5. EPI environmental performance policy categories and indicators  
Policy categories Indicators 
Climate change Greenhouse gas emissions 
Electricity carbon intensity 
Industrial carbon intensity 
Air pollution (effects on humans) Urban particulates 
Indoor air pollution 
Air pollution (effects on 
ecosystems) 
Sulfur dioxide emissions 
Nitrogen oxide emissions 
Ozone levels 
Water quality index 
Agriculture Pesticide regulation 
Agricultural water quality 
Agricultural subsidies 
Environmental burden of disease Environmental burden of disease 
Water (effects on humans) Access to drinking water 
Access to sanitation 
Water (effects on ecosystems) Water quality index 
Water stress 
Water scarcity index 
Biodiversity & habitat Biome protection 
Critical habitat protection 
Marine protected areas 
Forestry Growing stock 
Forest cover 
Fisheries Marine trophic index 
Trawling intensity 
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The EPI is scaled from 0 to 100, where 0 reflects the lowest possible 
environmental policy stringency and effectiveness and 100 reflects the highest possible 
standards. Actual 2010 EPI country scores range from a high of 93.5 (Iceland) to a low 
of 32.1 (Sierra Leone). Table 2.6 summarizes the 2010 EPI scores for the headquarters 
countries included in this study’s sample.  
 
TABLE 2.6. Sample headquarters country 2010 EPI scores 
Country EPI  Country EPI  Country EPI 
Australia 65.7  India 48.3  Poland 63.1 
Belgium 58.1  Ireland 67.1  Portugal 73.0 
Canada 66.4  Italy 73.1  Singapore 69.6 
China 49.0  Japan 72.5  Spain 70.6 
Denmark 69.2  S. Korea 57.0  Sweden 86.0 
Finland 74.7  Luxembourg 67.8  Switzerland 89.1 
France 78.2  Malaysia 65.0  Thailand 62.2 
Germany 73.2  Netherlands 66.4  United Kingdom 74.2 
Greece 60.9  Norway 81.1  United States 63.5 
 
The average formal institutional distance for each firm’s portfolio of locations is 
calculated using the same basic technique as the informal institutional distance measure 
(PIID), consistent with other portfolio-level operationalizations in the international 
business literature (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia & 
Palich, 1997; Kim & Park, 2002; Nachum & Song, 2011; Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011). 
First, the formal institutional distance between each headquarters-subsidiary dyad is 
calculated by subtracting the headquarters country EPI value from the subsidiary country 
EPI value. Second, all dyadic headquarters-subsidiary formal institutional distances for 
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the firm are then averaged to create the MNE’s average portfolio formal institutional 
distance (PFID), reflected by the following formula: 
PFID Firm = 
 
 [
∑ [𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑆𝑢𝑏− 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑄]
𝑁𝑆𝑢𝑏
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑆𝑢𝑏
]
 
 
(2.2) 
where:  
PFIDFirm = The firm’s average Portfolio Formal Institutional Distance 
i = Suffix indicating the different subsidiaries 
NSub = Number of subsidiaries in the firm’s portfolio 
EPISub = EPI value for the firm’s ith subsidiary’s country 
EPIHQ = EPI value for the firm’s headquarters (HQ) country 
 
Several aspects of this operationalization of portfolio formal institutional 
distance are notable. Shenkar (2001) and Zaheer et al. (2012) have pointed out faulty 
assumptions commonly made by international business researchers in the 
conceptualization and operationalization of distance (including, but not limited to, 
institutional distance). Two such weaknesses include assuming symmetry between 
distance components and neglecting to consider directionality within the distance 
measure. Most distance measures take the absolute value or square of differences such 
that the distance from Country A to Country B is typically treated as equivalent to the 
distance from Country B to A (Zaheer, et al., 2012).  
Based on the theoretical model presented, this study makes no such assumptions 
regarding the average portfolio formal institutional distance. Due to the hierarchical 
nature of formal institutions, my measurement of formal institutional distance considers 
both sign and direction. A large, positive portfolio formal institutional distance reflects a 
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firm whose subsidiaries are (on average) operating in locations which have much higher 
CSP expectations than the firm’s headquarter location: e.g. the Chinese firm 
establishing subsidiaries in northern Europe. Conversely, a smaller or negative portfolio 
formal institutional distance reflects a firm whose headquarters location has higher CSP 
expectations than the countries in which its subsidiary locations are operating: e.g. a 
U.S.-based firm expanding into Asia. A firm headquartered in a country with low CSP 
expectations based on a low country EPI is more likely to have a relative high formal 
institutional distance, depending on the specific locations reflected in its portfolio of 
locations.  
 
International scope: In this study International scope reflects the dispersion of 
firm operations across multiple national markets. Consistent with prior international 
social responsibility research (Bansal, 2005; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Brammer, Pavelin, 
& Porter, 2006; Déniz-Déniz & Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Strike, et al., 2006), I measure 
each MNE’s international scope as the number of unique countries in which the firm 
operates, reflecting both headquarters as well as subsidiary locations.  
International scope is recognized as one of several different dimensions that 
comprise a firm’s overall international experience (Chetty, Eriksson, & Lindbergh, 
2006) and is closely related to other elements of international experience such as 
duration of time since the firm began international activity (Brouthers, O'Donnell, & 
Hadjimarcou, 2005) and international intensity, typically measured as a ratio of foreign 
to domestic sales (Hultman, Katsikeas, & Robson, 2011). Some CSR studies have also 
measured the firm’s international presence by the percentage or number of foreign 
subsidiaries (Kennelly & Lewis, 2002; Strike, et al., 2006). 
59 
 
However, this study is specifically interested in the firm’s exposure to foreign 
markets as a result of the geographic scope of its international experience. Other 
international experience measures (such as FSTS, international duration, or foreign 
subsidiaries) are more focused on the depth or intensity of MNE international 
experience (Chetty, et al., 2006; Strike, et al., 2006), as opposed to the geographic 
dispersion. For this reason, this study focuses on international scope as measured by 
number of countries. 
It should be noted that international scope is also sometimes measured at a 
regional level, reflecting the number of unique geographic regions (as opposed to 
countries) in which the firm operates (Chetty, et al., 2006; Kennelly & Lewis, 2002). 
The country-level variable was selected for this study because it provides more 
information and is more commonly used in both the social responsibility and general 
international business literature. To calculate each firm’s international scope, all 
subsidiary locations and the headquarters location associated with each MNE were 
obtained from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ (S&P Capital IQ) database. The 
international scope represents the log of the count of the number of distinct countries in 
which the MNE has at least one location. 
 
Control Variables  
A number of control variables found to predict CSP in previous social 
responsibility research were used. Unless otherwise noted, all control variables were 
obtained from the S&P Capital IQ database.  
Following prior studies which identified a relationship between the size of a firm 
and CSP (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Strike, et al., 2006; Udayasankar, 2008), Firm size 
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is measured as the log of the number of employees. Following Barnea and Rubin (2010), 
Firm experience is measured as the log of age of the firm since its founding, in years. 
Industry dummies were coded to distinguish industry sectors provided by S&P Capital 
IQ: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, 
information technology, materials, telecommunication services and utilities.  
Social responsibility patterns can vary significantly between different geographic 
regions (McWilliams, et al., 2006). Additionally, the sample selection in this study 
resulted in a relatively large presence in three specific countries, with Japan, United 
Kingdom, and United States accounting for over 60% of the sample. Therefore I 
controlled for firm headquarters Region in this study. Dummy indicators were created for 
the three regions in the sample: Asian, European, and the North American. Because 
Europe was the most prevalent region in the sample, the dummy variable for Europe was 
omitted in the regression analyses. 
The Home country power distance reflects the degree to which the headquarters 
country national culture is generally accepting of authority and power distribution 
inequality within the society. Prior studies examining the relationship of national culture 
attributes to CSP have consistently found power distance to be a significant predictor of 
corporate social responsibility outcomes at the country, firm, and managerial levels of 
analysis (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Park, et al., 2007; Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Waldman, 
et al., 2006). The Hofstede national culture power distance value (Hofstede, 1980) for 
each firm’s headquarters country is used to measure the home country power distance 
control variable for each firm. Table 2.7 lists all variable definitions and data sources. 
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TABLE 2.7. Variables, measures, and sources of data  
 Variable Measure Source 
Variables 
of interest 
Corporate social 
performance 
(CSP) 
Metric interval variable measuring 
the degree of firm social 
responsibility, from 0 (low) to 100 
(high) 
CSRHub 2011 
Portfolio 
informal 
institutional 
distance (PIID) 
Indicator of the weighted average 
of the cultural distance between 
the MNE’s subsidiary countries 
and its headquarters country. 
Hofstede (1980) 
Portfolio formal 
institutional 
distance (PFID) 
Indicator of the difference 
between the headquarters country 
social responsibility standards and 
the average subsidiary country 
social responsibility standards.  
World Economic 
Forum 2010 
Environmental 
Performance 
Index 
International 
scope 
Indicator of dispersion of firm 
international presence across 
multiple national markets, 
measured by the natural log of the 
number of distinct countries in 
which the firm has a headquarters 
&/or subsidiary location 
S&P Capital IQ 
Control 
variables 
Firm size 
 
Natural log of number of 
employees 
S&P Capital IQ 
Firm experience  Natural log of the age of the firm 
(years since founding) 
S&P Capital IQ 
Industry Dummy indicators for 10 industry 
sectors 
S&P Capital IQ 
Home region Dummy indicators for Asia, 
Europe, and North America 
S&P Capital IQ 
Home country 
power distance 
Indicator of the firm’s 
headquarters location country 
power distance level 
Hofstede (1980) 
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RESULTS 
Because (1) the dependent variable is measured via a single, metric interval scale 
variable and (2) the research model includes moderation, hypotheses were tested using 
hierarchical moderated regression (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). One-tailed tests 
were used for all regression variables because the hypotheses are directional. Sample 
skewness and kurtosis levels were confirmed to be within recommended thresholds (Hair, 
et al., 2010). Table 2.8 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the study’s sample.  
 
TABLE 2.8. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Firm CSP 55.48 6.556 33 71 -.423 .273 
International Scope 20.46 17.107 2 106 -.208 † -.602 † 
Portfolio Formal 
Institutional Distance 
-3.47 5.578 -27.37 11.72 -.969 2.068 
Portfolio Informal 
Institutional Distance 
5.87 2.437 .0246 12.42 -.120 -.161 
Firm Size  48,360 71,045 1,328 472,000 .107 † -.494 † 
Firm Experience  93.4 61.641 3 539 -1.178 † 1.457 † 
HQ Power Distance 44.42 11.906 18 104 .762 .716 
n = 408. 
† Statistics represent variable post logarithmic transformation. 
 
Prior to running the regression equations, bivariate correlations were examined 
(Table 2.9). None of the significant correlations between the independent variables 
exceeded the recommended 0.70 co-linearity threshold (Hair, et al., 2010). 
  
   
  
6
3 
TABLE 2.9. Correlations of variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
01. Firm CSP - 
     
      
02. International Scope † .372** - 
    
      
03. PIID (Informal Distance) .048 .477** - 
   
      
04. PFID (Formal Distance) -.020 -.100* -.173** - 
  
      
05. Firm Size † .452** .631** .249** -.051 - 
 
      
06. Firm Experience † .018 .108* .094 .003 .091 -       
07. HQ Region – Asia -.242** -.231** .318** -.029 -.115* -.030 -      
08. HQ Region – Europe .175** .135** -.212** -.322** .041 .009 -.654** -     
09. HQ Region – N America .060 .097 -.102* .436** .081 .023 -.331** -.497** -    
10. HQ Power Distance -.179** -.051 -.023 .097 .047 -.115* .499** -.302** -.196** -   
Industries: 11. Financials -.009 .011 -.168** .043 .013 .152** -.078 .076 -.004 .007 -  
12. Materials -.070 -.124* .005 -.066 -.207** -.020 .038 -.016 -.024 -.047 -.203** - 
13. Energy -.001 -.062 -.090 .121* -.120* -.057 -.029 -.123* .187** .025 -.115* -.111* 
14. Consumer Discretionary .024 -.005 .047 -.022 .059 .009 .119* .004 -.142** .016 -.179** -.173** 
15. Consumer Staples .006 .053 .087 .082 .060 .029 -.129** .086 .041 -108* -.132** -.127* 
16. Telecommunications .063 .094 .021 -.038 .154** -.154** -.063 .085 -.034 -.011 -.069 -.067 
17. Industrials -.056 .081 .123* -.103* .118* .049 .029 .017 -.055 -.009 -.241** -.232** 
18. Information Technology .032 .023 .086 -.010 .004 -.080 .089 -.118* .044 .040 -.120* -.116* 
19. Healthcare -.025 .097* .035 .029 -.005 .011 .006 -.079 .092 .026 -.101* -.098* 
20. Utilities .149** -.139** -.181** .048 -.035 -.129** -.045 .037 .005 .106* -101* -.098* 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, n = 408 (two-tailed tests). † Statistics represent variable post logarithmic transformation.
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TABLE 2.9. Correlations of variables (continued) 
Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
13. Energy -        
14. Cons. Discretionary -.098* -       
15. Consumer Staples -.072 -.112* -      
16. Telecommunications -.038 -.059 -.043 -     
17. Industrials -.131** -.205** -.150** -.079 -    
18. Info Technology -.065 -.102* -.075 -.039 -.137** -   
19. Healthcare -.055 -.086 -.063 -.033 -.116* -.058 -  
20. Utilities -.055 -.086 -.063 -.033 -.116* -.058 -.049 - 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, n = 408 (two-tailed tests). 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 2 (examining the moderating effects of the MNE’s 
Portfolio formal institutional distance on the relationship between International scope 
and CSP) an interaction variable was created. The interaction variable was calculated by 
multiplying International scope (number of discrete countries in which the firm is 
operating) and Portfolio formal institutional distance (the difference between the 
headquarters country social responsibility standard and the firm subsidiary portfolio’s 
average country social responsibility standard). To minimize multicollinearity, variables 
used to create the interaction term were centered prior to the calculation and subsequent 
regressions (Cohen, et al., 2003).  
Table 2.10 shows the hierarchical regression results of the three models used to 
test the hypothesized relationships between the portfolio institutional distance variables 
and firm CSP levels. Variance inflation factor scores (VIFs) reported in the results of all 
three regression models were inspected and compared to the conservative low-end 
threshold of 3.0 (Hair, et al., 2010, p. 204). With the exception of the Industry dummy  
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TABLE 2.10. Hierarchical regression results  
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Intercept 33.75 (3.51) 41.10 (4.22) 40.94 (4.20) 
Firm Size  6.03*** (.56) 4.89*** (.67) 4.86*** (.69) 
Firm Experience  -.27 (.79) -.34 (.78) -.31 (.78) 
HQ Region – Asia -1.73** (.75) -.57 (.91) -.51 (.90) 
HQ Region – N. America -1.20* (.75) -1.54* (.85) -1.34* (.85) 
HQ Power Distance  -.10*** (.03) -.12*** (.03) -.12*** (.03) 
Industries:       
 Consumer Discretionary 1.21 (2.05) 1.13 (2.03) 1.15 (2.03) 
 Consumer Staples -.09 (2.15) -.03 (2.14) -.03 (2.13) 
 Energy 3.06* (2.26) 2.83 (2.25) 2.63 (2.24) 
 Financials .87 (2.04) .61 (2.02) .39 (2.02) 
 Healthcare .87 (2.31) .31 (2.30) .19 (2.29) 
 Industrials -.27 (2.00) -.26 (1.98) -.27 (1.97) 
 Information Technology 2.43 (2.20) 2.32 (2.18) 2.60 (2.18) 
 Materials 1.54 (2.05) 1.53 (2.04) 1.73 (2.03) 
 Utilities 6.47*** (2.30) 6.78*** (2.28) 6.73*** (2.28) 
International Scope  -  3.60*** (1.17) 3.82*** (1.17) 
PIID -  -.26** (.16) -.25* (.16) 
PFID  -  .06 (.06) .09* (.06) 
PFID x International Scope -  -  -.30** (.15) 
Overall model R-square  .308 .326 .333 
Adjusted R-square  .283 .296 .302 
Change in R-square   
-
  
.018 .007 
F-value for change in R2  - 3.401 4.350 
F-value sig for  in R2  - .018 .038 
Overall F-value  12.488*** 11.073*** 10.790*** 
Dependent variable = CSP in all models. n = 408 in all models. 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed tests).  
Unstandardized coefficients with corresponding standard errors in parentheses. 
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variables, all VIFs were between 1.102 and 2.686, confirming that multicollinearity 
between the variables of interest was not a problem in the research model. VIFs for 
industry dummy variables had a higher range, from 3.087 to 8.893, which is still below 
the recommended high-end threshold of 10.0. 
Model 1 contains only the control variables. The overall control model is 
statistically significant (R2 = .308, p = .000). Consistent with prior CSP research, Firm 
size (b = 6.03, p = .000) and Headquarters country power distance (b = -.10, p = .000) 
were confirmed to be significant. The Region dummy variables for Asia (b = -1.73, p =<  
0.05) and North America (b = -.1.20, p < 0.10) were also significant. Two Industry 
sectors were found to be a significant predictor of firm CSP levels in the control model: 
Energy (b = 3.06, p < 0.10) and Utilities (b = 6.47, p < 0.01). Firm experience (measured 
by the age of the firm) was not found to be significant (b = -27, n.s.). 
Model 2 adds the independent variables. The overall model is statistically 
significant (R2 = .326, p = .000) and represents a significant change in R2 over Model 1 
(change in R2 = 0.018, p < 0.05). In examining the individual independent variables, the 
regression results confirm the findings of prior research that greater international scope is 
positively related to social performance (b = 3.61, p = .000).  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher informal institutional distance in the MNE’s 
portfolio (PIID) will be related to lower levels of firm CSP. Portfolio informal 
institutional distance was found to be negatively related to firm CSP (b = -.26, p <  
0.05); this supports Hypothesis 1: The greater the informal institutional distance between 
an MNE’s headquarters location and its portfolio of subsidiaries, the lower the MNE’s 
corresponding CSP.  
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Model 3 tests the interaction effect of Portfolio formal institutional distance and 
International scope on CSP posited by Hypothesis 2. Model 3 is statistically significant 
(R2 = .333, p = .000) and represents a significant change in R2 over the Model 2 main 
effects (change in R2 = 0.007, p < 0.05). Model 3 regression coefficients show that the 
interaction of MNE’s International scope and Portfolio formal institutional distance is 
negative and significant (b = -.30, p < 0.05). This provides initial support for the presence 
of moderation and Hypothesis 2: The relationship between international scope and MNE 
CSP is moderated by formal institutional distance such that the benefits of increased 
international scope are reduced when formal institutional distances within the MNE 
portfolio are higher.  
To interpret the interaction between Portfolio formal institutional distance and 
International scope, I drew an interaction plot using values of one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of each interaction variable per Aiken & West (1991). I 
defined firms operating in a number of countries at least one standard deviation above the 
mean number of countries as having high international scope; firms in a number of 
countries less than one standard deviation below the mean number of countries were 
defined as having low international scope. Likewise, I used one standard deviation above 
and below the mean portfolio formal institutional distance measure to identify firms with 
high and low portfolio formal institutional distance respectively.  
Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates the nature of the interaction. With respect to 
CSP, all firms tend to benefit from increased international scope. Under both low formal 
institutional distance and high formal institutional distance conditions, greater 
international scope results in higher firm CSP. However, as evidenced by the steeper 
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slope of the low formal institutional distance line, firms with higher portfolio formal 
institutional distance do not receive as great of a CSP benefit from increased international 
expansion as firms with lower formal institutional distance. Firms with high portfolio 
formal institutional distance have higher subsidiary country CSP standards than are 
expected by their home country; this distance negatively affects the expected CSP 
benefits of increased international scope. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: Interaction of portfolio formal institutional distance (PFID) and 
international scope on firm CSP 
 
 
Following the recommended methods for testing the interaction between 
continuous variables (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, et al., 2003), I also conducted a 
simple slope analysis to test whether the slope of the interaction lines were significantly 
different from zero under a variety of levels of the moderating variable. The results are 
summarized in Table 2.11. For firms with low PFID (one standard deviation below the 
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mean), the results of the simple slope test were significantly different from zero (simple 
slope = 5.513, t = 3.719, p = .000). The simple slope test for firms with medium levels of 
PFID (equal to the mean) was also significantly different from zero (simple slope = 
3.823, t = 3.258, p < 0.01). However, at high levels of PFID (one standard deviation 
above the mean), the simple slope test was not significant (simple slope = 2.133, t = 
1.563, n.s.).  
These results indicate that while the overall interaction of International scope and 
PFID on CSP is significant, we have highest confidence that the dependent variable, 
CSP, increases with increased international scope at lower levels of PFID. As we move 
to firms with higher levels of PFID, however, CSP may not be affected by a firm’s 
international scope. 
  
TABLE 2.11. Simple slope analysis results †  
Conditions 
PFID 
value 
Simple 
slope 
t P 
Low PFID -5.57765 5.513 3.719 .000 
Medium PFID 0 3.823 3.258 .001 
High PFID 5.57765 2.133 1.563 .119 
† Interaction of Portfolio formal institutional distance (PFID) and International scope on 
firm CSP. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
I began this study by considering how formal and informal institutional distances 
within a MNE’s portfolio of locations might influence the firm’s overall CSP. 
Institutional theory recognizes the unique environmental pressures that influence a 
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firm’s drive toward local legitimacy. Large institutional distance represents a large 
discrepancy between home and host institutional environments. Previous research has 
focused on how specific headquarters-based institutional and cultural factors may affect 
CSP levels. Here I advance the CSP literature by theorizing and empirically examining 
how formal and informal institutional distance in the firm’s overall portfolio of 
operating locations affects MNE CSP.  
I theorized that the informal and formal components of institutional distance can 
negatively influence firm CSP in two different ways. First, I hypothesized that firm CSP 
would be negatively affected by greater average informal institutional distance between 
its headquarters and full set of subsidiary locations, as measured by the firm’s portfolio-
level aggregate cultural distance. Additionally, I hypothesized that greater formal 
institutional distance within the firm’s operating portfolio reduces the CSP benefits of 
greater international scope. 
I tested my institutional distance hypotheses on a broad sample of 408 firms 
headquartered in 27 different countries spanning the European, Asian, and North 
American regions. As expected, I found that firm MNE CSP suffers when the aggregate 
cultural distance between the headquarters location and portfolio of subsidiary locations 
is high, reflecting a large portfolio-level informal institutional disparity between the 
countries in which the firm is operating.  
In my second hypothesis I explored the moderating influence of home-host 
country formal institutional distance and the firm’s international scope. I found that firms 
with greater formal institutional distance, as reflected in the country social responsibility 
standards differences between headquarters and portfolio of locations, experience fewer 
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CSP benefits from increased international scope. These findings reflect the challenges 
firms can expect to face in understanding and responding to local formal CSP 
expectations that are very different from their headquarters location.  
These results suggest that MNEs headquartered in countries with relatively 
stronger formal institutions that emphasize CSP, such as Sweden, are at an advantage in 
terms of the CSP benefits associated with international expansion compared to firms 
headquartered in countries with relatively lower CSP standards, such as China. Because 
the Swedish firm’s home country high CSP standards meet or exceed most subsidiary 
location standards, its portfolio formal institutional distance will generally be a very 
small or negative number; that is the Swedish firm is able to apply its high standards of 
CSP experience to other locations, gaining the CSP benefits associated with greater 
international scope. 
Conversely, CSP standards are generally lower in Asia than in other regions of the 
globe. When a firm headquartered in China chooses to expand internationally, it can be 
expected to encounter subsidiary locations with higher CSP expectations than its Chinese 
home country standards. As a result the Chinese firm will have a greater formal 
institutional distance to overcome as it expands geographically, leading to lower CSP 
benefits associated with greater international scope. These results supporting Hypothesis 
2 suggest that the typical Chinese firm cannot expect to receive as great a CSP benefit 
from expanding into additional countries as a typical Swedish firm due to the larger 
portfolio formal institutional distance. Thus firms from higher CSP countries will on 
average tend to benefit more from international expansion that firms from lower CSP 
nations, from a CSP perspective. 
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Contribution  
One unique research contribution of this study is the application of the concept 
of the MNE operating portfolio. The operating portfolio is based on a consideration of 
the full set of subsidiary operating locations specific to a given MNE and may provide a 
useful vantage point from which to explore institutional influences on MNEs. The 
international business literature has used the distance between sets of two specific 
countries, typically a headquarters/subsidiary combination or a home country/target host 
country dyad to study numerous phenomena of interest to MNEs. However, this study 
considers the entire set of operating locations particular to a MNE when evaluating the 
effects of distance on CSP. The portfolio conceptualization recognizes that both the 
number of countries and corresponding institutional profiles of the specific countries in 
which a MNE is operating play a role in defining the MNE’s unique challenges and 
opportunities. The MNE portfolio may provide insights that can overcome some of the 
limitations of applying institutional theory to MNEs and represents a paradigm that may 
offer unique insights if applied in other international business research areas. 
Another research contribution of this study is its asymmetric conceptualization of 
formal institutional distance. Distance in international business research is most 
commonly conceived as the absolute value of the difference between two points 
(Shenkar, 2001; Zaheer, et al., 2012); that is, the institutional distance from Country A to 
Country B is typically treated as equivalent to the distance from Country B to A.  
This study moves beyond this non-directional dyadic view and instead considers 
the difference between the CSP standards of the MNE’s subsidiary location countries as 
compared to its home country to operationalize the firm’s formal institutional distance. 
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Unlike informal institutional distance, the firm’s portfolio formal institutional distance is 
assumed to be neither symmetrical nor bidirectional.  
The theoretical foundation for this operationalization was found in an examination 
of the inherent differences between formal and informal institutional distances. Informal 
institutional differences cannot necessarily be overcome with experience; each country 
has a unique culture. In contrast, formal institutional requirements are both finite and 
hierarchical; once a firm has met a high, stringent formal institutional level, that 
experience can be leveraged for subsequent country expansions.  
Therefore, a MNE headquartered in a country with a lower CSP standard than its 
subsidiary portfolio countries could face a very large formal institutional distance. In 
contrast, a MNE headquartered in a country with higher CSP standards than the MNE’s 
subsidiary portfolio can be expected to have a very small or negative formal institutional 
distance with which to contend. This research contribution helps address some of the 
criticisms that have been levied against the typical application of distance in international 
business research (Shenkar, 2001; Zaheer, et al., 2012). Other international business 
studies that utilize institutional distance may also want to consider whether the dynamics 
of formal vs. informal institutional distance may also be different in other research 
settings. 
 
Managerial Implications 
This research contributes to the international business and CSP literature by 
highlighting how firm CSP may be affected by formal and informal institutional distance 
within the firm’s total operating portfolio. As firms expand internationally into new 
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country markets, managers may want to consider the implications of the institutional 
distances created by their country selections. Managers may want to consider the 
potential CSP effects of expanding into target countries that are institutionally distant 
from their home environment. This may be especially important for firms headquartered 
in regions that have low CSP standards, such as emerging market firms, looking to 
expand to countries with higher CSP standards, such as into more institutionally-
developed economic regions. Managers have an opportunity to make decisions which 
minimize the potential negative effects on CSP. 
A firm headquartered in a country that has relatively higher standards of social 
responsibility practices will have developed specific capabilities to achieve compliance 
with high levels of formal institutional regulation. As the firm expands into countries 
with relatively lower regulatory CSP expectations, their already-developed capabilities 
may supersede the requirements of the new country. Therefore, formal institutional 
distance (regardless of the extent of the firm’s other international experience) between the 
home and host countries may become a non-issue for these firms. Conversely, the formal 
institutional distance and corresponding international scope can be very relevant for a 
firm headquartered in a country with relatively lower standards of social responsibility 
practices. This firm may not yet have faced the more stringent regulatory expectations 
that the target host country requires. Such a firm may find the higher standards adversely 
affect its CSP.  
 
Limitations 
This proposed study has several limitations which may offer opportunities for 
future streams of research building upon this study’s findings. Although the research 
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design includes the holistic consideration of the MNE as a portfolio, the scope of the 
portfolio used in this study is limited to company subsidiary locations. The portfolio 
operationalization does not consider non-subsidiary alliance partners and the associated 
resources and potential influences from this broader network of relationships. Recent 
research has indicated that these networks may be important considerations to capture the 
full dynamics affecting MNEs (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Zaheer & Hernandez, 2011). 
It should also be noted that in measuring the institutional distances at a portfolio 
level, all subsidiaries are weighted equally, consistent with the approach used in other 
recent portfolio-level studies (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010; Gomez-
Mejia & Palich, 1997; Kim & Park, 2002; Nachum & Song, 2011; Zaheer & Hernandez, 
2011). Future research may be able to incorporate theory that could further delineate and 
weight subsidiaries based upon other factors, such as the percent of revenue or number of 
employees associated with each subsidiary.  
There are also opportunities for future research associated with the specific 
choices of nation-level institutional measurements. Additional measures of formal and 
informal institutions relevant to the domain of CSP could also be incorporated into the 
research model. The country-level attributes used to calculate the institutional distances 
do not account for possible within-country variance (Egri & Ralston, 2008), so it is 
possible that as more within-country institutional measures become available, this 
research could be expanded to incorporate them.  
Furthermore, this study is cross-sectional. A longitudinal research design could be 
used to explore whether the CSP effects of institutional distance diminish over time, as 
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has been found to be the case of cultural distance effects on subsidiary control 
mechanisms (Wilkinson, et al., 2008), for example.  
The Environmental Performance Index used to measure the formal institutional 
distance within the firm’s portfolio of locations in this study is based on only one of the 
foundational pillars of social responsibility, the environment. As reliable country-level 
indicators for broad ranges of countries that encompass more of the dimensions of CSP 
(such as social and employee-related) become available, these dimensions could be 
incorporated into the formal distance measurement. 
One of the general limitations prevalent in much social responsibility research is 
the lack of standardization of CSP rating methodologies in use (Márquez & Fombrun, 
2005; Turker, 2009; Wood, 2010). Future studies could replicate this study’s findings 
using alternative CSP rating data sources or disaggregated rating subsets. Future research 
could examine the influence of formal and informal institutional distance on one or more 
dimensions of corporate social responsibility, such as firm environmental performance, 
labor relations, or governance practices. Future research could also incorporate 
performance outcomes to determine if either of the CSP-related institutional distance 
measures have a relationship with firm financial performance.  
 
Conclusion 
This study’s findings indicate that institutional distance matters to firm CSP. 
Operating in countries which are very different culturally or which have higher CSP 
expectations as compared to the firm home country location may compromise the firm’s 
overall CSP results. If the firm’s goal is to have a strong CSP, managers should select 
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countries which have similar formal and informal institutional profiles to their home 
country to minimize the negative influence of institutional distance on firm CSP.  
The findings suggest that institutional distance may be particularly relevant (and 
disadvantageous) for firms headquartered in countries with relatively lower CSP 
standards, such as emerging market firms. Firms from countries with higher formal 
institutional standards can more readily transfer their experience to countries with lower 
standards. However firms from countries with lower formal institutional standards cannot 
necessarily transfer their experience to countries with higher standards. Hence, when 
institutional distance is greater, firms from countries with higher formal institutional 
standards with greater international experience will be less negatively affected than those 
with less international experience.  
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CHAPTER 3 (Paper 2) 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL CORRUPTION ENVIRONMENTS AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY 
 
Abstract 
In this study I examine the underexplored antecedents and consequences of 
multinational enterprise (MNE) corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) by theorizing and 
empirically examining how levels of corruption in a MNE’s external environment affect 
the firm’s level of CSiR and subsequent performance. Using an institutional theory 
framework developed by North (1990), corruption is conceptualized as having both 
formal and informal dimensions. Applying a portfolio approach used in prior 
international business studies to view an MNE’s environment as the sum of all of its 
geographic locations, I hypothesize and find that higher levels of formal and/or informal 
corruption environments are related to higher levels of MNE CSiR. I also explore the 
normative aspects of social irresponsibility and find that firms with higher CSiR will be 
outperformed by less socially irresponsible firms. The results support the notion that 
there are institutionally-driven ties between formal and informal corruption, social 
irresponsibility, and firm performance. 
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social irresponsibility 
(CSiR), institutional theory, multinational enterprise (MNE), portfolio, corruption, two-
stage least squares regression (2SLS)
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INTRODUCTION 
While research concerning corporate social responsibility (CSR) continues to 
grow (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012), there has been relatively little scholarly interest in 
examining corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). CSR is associated with doing ‘good 
deeds’; conversely CSiR reflects a firm’s ‘bad deeds’ (Muller & Kräussl, 2011). CSiR 
can result from a firm strategy, decision, and/or action that “negatively affects an 
identifiable social stakeholder's legitimate claims (in the long run)” (Strike, Gao, & 
Bansal, 2006, p. 852). More negative actions on the part of the firm can result in higher 
levels of social irresponsibility. Thus, CSiR is more than simply a firm’s failure to act in 
a responsible manner (Lange & Washburn, 2012). 
It may be tempting to regard CSR and CSiR as opposite ends of the same 
continuum, but CSiR is a concept distinct from CSR (Lange & Washburn, 2012; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Wood, 2010). Simply interpreting CSiR as a low level of 
overall firm CSR is not sufficient (McGuire, Dow, & Argheyd, 2003; Muller & Kräussl, 
2011). This is because firms can potentially exhibit both CSR and CSiR behavior 
simultaneously (Strike, et al., 2006). A firm might have a strong record in one area of 
social responsibility but act irresponsibly in another area. For example, per the 2010 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics social responsibility ratings, Starbucks 
exhibited high levels of CSR in the categories of environmental sustainability and 
community relations. At the same time, concerns regarding labor practices within 
Starbucks’ supply chain resulted in high employee relations-related irresponsibility levels 
(MSCI, 2010). Firms may even invest in more ‘good’ to compensate for their past or 
current irresponsibility practices (Kotchen & Moon, 2011) or to act as a type of insurance 
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against future irresponsibility (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Minor & Morgan, 
2011).  
In addition, a given action may be seen as socially responsible from one 
stakeholder perspective but irresponsible from another (Wood, 2010). When Shell Oil 
was removed from the Dow Jones Sustainability Index in 2010 because of environmental 
and human rights irresponsibility in its Nigerian operations, exiting the country was 
considered to be the socially responsible decision to eliminate these violations 
(Datamonitor, 2011). The Nigerian exit option was also viewed as potentially 
irresponsible due to concerns that Shell’s presence would only be replaced with even less 
environmentally and human rights-sensitive state-owned Chinese oil companies. CSR 
and CSiR have unique dynamics and therefore deserve disparate consideration. 
Compared to CSR, there has been scant focus on the antecedents and 
consequences of CSiR behavior (Greenwood, 2007; Lange & Washburn, 2012). Aside 
from the isolated insights that greater international diversification can lead to higher 
CSiR (Strike, et al., 2006) and certain executive compensation structures can be 
associated with higher levels of firm CSiR (McGuire, et al., 2003), what we know about 
social irresponsibility is extremely limited. This is surprising, since “perceptions of social 
irresponsibility are likely to generate stronger observer reactions and ultimately loom 
much larger for the firm than perceptions of social responsibility” (Lange & Washburn, 
2012, p. 301). The reverberations associated with incidents of and reputations for CSiR 
can have a greater (negative) influence on the value of the firm than any positive 
increases associated with CSR (Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010; Frooman, 1997; 
Muller & Kräussl, 2011). 
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The lack of prior research attention to CSiR offers opportunities to explore the 
potential CSiR implications of a variety of institutional environmental factors external to 
the firm. One institutional environmental influence that has not yet been considered 
within the context of overall firm CSiR is corruption. Like social irresponsibility, 
corruption is a non-market force that has ethical implications for the firm and can have a 
potential negative impact on organizations (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006). 
Because different countries exhibit different levels of public and private corruption 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), a consideration of corruption’s relationship to CSiR may be 
particularly relevant to multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are subject to a wide 
variety of different external influences stemming from their diverse, multiple, country-
spanning operating environments (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008).  
International business research has confirmed that firms headquartered in 
countries characterized by lower corruption have higher levels of social responsibility 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). Additionally, previous research within the economics 
literature has found negative relationships between corruption and the stringency of 
country-level environmental policy and country environmental performance (Damania, 
Fredriksson, & List, 2003; Doig & Mclvor, 1999; Lopez & Mitra, 2000; Morse, 2006; 
Welsch, 2004). These studies provide prima facie support for the notion that corruption 
may be linked to some aspects of CSiR.  
In this paper I use an institutional theory lens to examine the impact of both 
formal and informal aspects of corruption on corporate social irresponsibility in an 
international context. Institutional theory recognizes that firms strive to align themselves 
within their external institutional environment (Kostova, et al., 2008). This institutional 
environment is comprised of both formal institutions, which include codified regulations 
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and laws, and informal institutions, which encompass the more tacit cultural and 
behavioral norms (North, 1990). 
I conceptualize the MNE as a portfolio of international locations and take into 
account corruption characteristics of all locations in which the MNE has an operating 
presence. Building on institutional theory, I develop theory that suggests a firm’s 
operating environment is comprised of both a formal corruption environment (FCE) and 
an informal corruption environmental (ICE) component. The FCE reflects the level of 
corruption within the country’s public sector, encompassing corruption inherent in formal 
governmental, political, and administrative institutions. The ICE captures the general 
public’s views on and experiences with corruption in their everyday lives, reflecting the 
more general national penetration of corruption in the country’s culture. I hypothesize 
that due to formal and informal institutional influences, higher FCE and/or ICE in the 
portfolio of countries in which a MNE is operating will be related to higher levels of firm 
CSiR.  
Further, I investigate the normative aspects of social irresponsibility by 
investigating the question of whether CSiR is related to MNE performance. Prior 
research has established a variety of relationships between CSR and firm financial 
performance (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, 
Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Peloza, 2009), but we do not yet know if CSiR is related to firm 
performance. I develop theory that suggests CSiR is related to performance for a number 
of reasons. CSiR may draw attention from both private (e.g. non-governmental 
organization) and public (e.g. regulatory) constituents, pressuring the firm to expend 
resources to rectify its irresponsible behavior and address resulting stakeholder harm, 
reducing performance. Additionally, not only can reacting to CSiR be a drain on firm 
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resources, but a pattern of socially irresponsible actions may put the firm’s legitimacy 
with its stakeholders at risk, reducing firm sales. For these reasons I hypothesize that 
firms with higher CSiR will be outperformed by firms that do not have to contend with 
these added costs and risks. 
Hence, I contribute to the international business and social responsibility 
literatures in several ways. First, this study is unique in that it is the first to explore the 
impact of a MNE’s overall social irresponsibility on its performance. Understanding the 
harmful results of corrupt and irresponsible behavior is an open issue in the social 
responsibility literature (Putrevu, McGuire, Siegel, & Smith, 2012). This study’s results 
provide new strategic insights into the importance and relevance of the consequences of 
CSiR to MNEs by linking CSiR and firm performance. 
I also examine antecedents of CSiR by testing the impacts of corruption levels 
evident the firm’s institutional environment. In doing so, my conceptualization of 
corruption as having both a formal and informal component is a novel contribution. 
Research typically limits the focus to formal (public sector) corruption. This study 
expands beyond formal corruption by highlighting the incremental influence of the 
under-emphasized general permeation of corruption in a society with the inclusion of the 
informal corruption environment. Finally, by regarding the entire location footprint of the 
MNE as a holistic unit, I am the first to examine social irresponsibility in a way that 
incorporates the corruption influences of the MNE’s entire portfolio of operating 
locations.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Institution-Based View 
I build on institutional theory in this study to explain how and why an external 
environmental force, such as corruption, affects firm behavior, specifically CSiR 
behavior. Institutional theory recognizes that firms seek legitimacy within their target 
markets (Scott, 2008). That is, they want their actions to be perceived as being “desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  
Firms rely on institutional cues to provide both explicit and implicit direction 
regarding what constitutes legitimacy. These cues can come from both formal and 
informal institutions, essentially defining the “rules of the game” for individuals and 
businesses (North, 1990, p. 3). North’s model specifies that formal institutions include 
governing structures such as political, judicial, and economic rules, regulations, and other 
formalized behavioral guidelines. Informal institutions permeate an individual’s full 
range of daily interactions. Interactions between family members, coworkers, and 
strangers are subject to certain informal constraints in the forms of expected behavioral 
norms, codes of conduct, and cultural norms and conventions.  
Despite their tacit and relatively ambiguous nature, informal institutions can be 
particularly important behavioral influences (North, 1990). This is because of a 
fundamental difference between formal and informal institutions. The clarity and strength 
of formal institutions varies between countries. Firms will be subject to greater formal 
institutional pressures in environments where those formal institutions are strong and 
well-developed. For example, emerging economies tend to have more underdeveloped 
formal institutional environments (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).  
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In contrast, all locations exert some form of informal institutional influence on 
their inhabitants. One country’s overall informal institutional environment is not 
necessarily “stronger” or “weaker” than another; it is simply different. For example, 
China and Sweden have very different cultural norms, but one would not characterize 
either country as having “more” or “less” culture than the other. Where formal 
institutional structures are weak, informal constraints tend to play an even larger role in 
influencing firm behavior (Peng & Heath, 1996).  
Formal and informal institutional norms are more than mere “background 
conditions” or contextual factors; they can be key drivers of strategic decisions (Peng, 
Sunny, Pinkham, & Hao, 2009). Institutional pressures provide direction that can help 
firms reduce uncertainty (Scott, 2008). The ability to understand and respond to the 
expectations of the institutional environment can drive a firm’s success (or failure) 
(Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Peng & Pleggenkuhle Miles, 2009). Achieving 
institutional legitimacy can enhance the prospects for the firm’s very survival (Kostova, 
et al., 2008).  
Establishing legitimacy within formal and informal institutional environments can 
become even more complex for MNEs who by definition operate in multiple countries 
with potentially diverse institutional expectations (Kostova, et al., 2008). Legitimacy may 
take different forms in different countries, conditions, and contexts. This dynamic can be 
particularly salient for MNEs doing business in emerging economies, where institutional 
environments may be in a state of transition (Peng, et al., 2009). 
Institutional theory is a particularly appropriate lens through which to view firm 
behavior with regards to social responsibility-related outcomes because social 
responsibility cues commonly emerge from the formal and informal institutions within 
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which the firm interacts (Campbell, 2007). MNEs may use such social responsibility cues 
to meet specific legitimacy expectations of their local stakeholders (Matten & Moon, 
2008). MNEs may tailor social responsibility investments and priorities to align with the 
institutional environment in a given host country market (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; Yang 
& Rivers, 2009). 
 
Institutionalized Corruption 
In this study I focus on one particular dimension of the MNE’s institutional 
environment: corruption. Much of the corruption research to date has emphasized public 
sector corruption, consistent with a definition of corruption as “the use of public office 
for private gain” (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998). In this study I conceptualize corruption 
more broadly, expanding the consideration of corruption beyond the public sector and 
conceiving it as “the misuse of entrusted [emphasis added] power for private gain” 
(Transparency International, 2010). Consistent with institutional theory, this broader 
definition recognizes that corruption can be promoted via both formal (public sector) and 
informal (culturally-reinforcing) mechanisms.  
Including an informal corruption component is an important distinction compared 
to typical corruption studies which focus primarily or solely on formal corruption in the 
public sector. The intent is to expand our conceptualization of corruption and its impacts. 
Without minimizing the significant global economic impact of corrupt commercial 
interactions involving public officials (Transparency International, 2010), the ubiquity of 
corruption into the general society can also be a factor affecting MNEs. The informal 
component of corruption captures this penetration of corruption into citizens’ everyday 
lives. Though not as codified or clearly structured as formal institutions, the informal 
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aspect of institutional pressures are still critical influences of what constitutes legitimacy 
(North, 1990). For this reason, I develop theory to explain how both the formal and 
informal aspects of corruption can influence CSiR.  
 
Corruption and Social Responsibility 
Corruption and social responsibility are related phenomena (Rodriguez, et al., 
2006). Both concepts represent unique non-market aspects of societies and recognize that 
firms are subject to formal and informal institutional influences found in their operating 
environments. Both corruption and social responsibility pressures may influence how 
firms interact with and respond to the expectations of governments, communities, and 
other local stakeholders. Though rarely studied together (Rodriguez, et al., 2006), prior 
research has begun to explore relationships between corruption and social responsibility 
upon which this study builds. 
Prior literature demonstrates the existence of relationships between corruption and 
certain aspects of social responsibility. For instance, firms headquartered in countries 
where their managers are expected to experience higher levels of corruption in their 
interactions with public officials have been shown to have correspondingly lower levels 
of positive social performance (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). Researchers have also found 
a negative relationship between corruption levels and environmental policy and 
performance (Damania, et al., 2003; Doig & Mclvor, 1999; Lopez & Mitra, 2000; Morse, 
2006; Welsch, 2004).  
There is also some evidence that operating in environments that are perceived to 
have higher levels of corruption may lead firms to invest less in social responsibility. 
Using a sample of MNEs with subsidiary locations operating in China, Luo (2006) found 
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that firms’ philanthropic contributions decrease in higher corruption environments. Firms 
are less likely to contribute socially when they perceive that their investments have a 
higher likelihood of being embezzled or misapplied by corrupt public officials. 
These few studies provide initial support for the notion that there are ties between 
corruption and social responsibility. But these studies have several shortcomings. First, 
whereas these studies explore CSR outcomes (environmental performance, philanthropy), 
they do not specifically examine corruption as a possible antecedent of socially 
irresponsible behavior, as I do here. Furthermore, these studies focus on formalized 
corruption within the public sector, whereas I conceptualize corruption as a multi-
dimensional construct with both formal (public) and informal (private) components. 
Finally, these studies do not take into account how the corrupt influences of a MNE’s 
entire portfolio of locations might impact the firm, focusing instead on individual country 
effects. In this study I contribute to this emerging area of research by theoretically and 
empirically exploring the relationships between MNE portfolio formal and informal 
corruption environments and firm social irresponsibility and performance as shown in 
Figure 3.1, advancing the international business and social responsibility literatures. 
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FIGURE 3.1. Conceptual research model 
 
Formal Corruption Environments and Firm Social Irresponsibility 
Corruption inherent in a nation’s public sector is found in governmental, political, 
and other administrative institutions. This governmental aspect of corruption is 
commonly treated synonymously with the overall level of corruption in corruption 
research (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006). In this study, consistent with 
institutional theory’s distinction between formal and informal institutions (North, 1990), I 
recognize public sector corruption as the formal corruption environment (FCE).  
Corrupt practices in these institutions can be considered “formalized” in that they 
reside directly within formal institutional structures established and sanctioned by the 
State. The payment of bribes to public officials, money predominantly sourced by 
corporations, is the most prevalent example of formalized corruption. It is estimated that 
over $1 trillion is paid in bribes annually worldwide (Hills, Fiske, & Mahmud, 2009). 
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Firms interact with public officials and formal institutional processes in a variety 
of ways in establishing and managing their local operations. An institutional framework 
put forth by Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden (2005) suggests in doing so firms can 
expect to be confronted with a higher degree of corrupt officials in some countries than 
others. They coin the term corruption pervasiveness as a reflection of the firm’s 
“expectation of the proportion of interactions with the state that will entail corrupt 
transactions” (Rodriguez, et al., 2005, p. 385).  
Institutional theory posits that cues from formal institutions influence a firm’s 
behavior, and a firm’s activities reflect the formalized norms of its operating environment 
(North, 1990). If formal institutional cues include corrupt or unethical practices, they are 
likely to have an impact on a firm’s actions in its search for institutional legitimacy. A 
more pervasive FCE increases the likelihood that the firm will encounter corruption 
within their public sector interactions, resulting in more opportunities for the firm to act 
in a corrupt manner (Argandoña, 2007), likewise leading to greater firm participation in 
corruption (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006).  
This dynamic is even more complex for MNEs, firms that operate in multiple 
countries representing a potentially wide variety of institutional environments (Kostova 
& Roth, 2002). Different countries may have different levels of formalized corruption 
within their public sector institutions (Rodriguez, et al., 2005). For instance, corruption 
levels have been found to be higher in emerging economies because of weaknesses in 
institutional infrastructures (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000; 
Kaufmann, 2004; Li, 2009; Venard & Hanafi, 2008). Corrupt practices may also be 
imitated by and copied between countries (Argandoña, 2007). Thus, each country within 
a MNE’s set of subsidiary locations may present the firm with a unique FCE within 
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which the firm acts. From an institutional perspective, firm behavior may therefore be 
influenced by the FCE of the collective set of locations within which they have chosen to 
operate, their operating portfolio (Nachum & Song, 2011).  
Corruption and social irresponsibility are closely related in that they both 
represent non-market forces that impact the actions of MNEs; “the non-market 
environment offers both opportunities and risks for MNEs” (Rodriguez, et al., 2006, p. 
734). I argue that firms that establish and maintain operational legitimacy in portfolios of 
locations characterized by high FCEs may be more likely to act irresponsibly. There are 
several reasons for this. 
First, high FCEs may allow or even encourage MNE managers to side-step 
socially responsible behavior, resulting in CSiR. In environments where formal 
corruption flourishes due to lack of controls, MNEs “may become motivated to lower 
ethical standards, ranging from environmental negligence and abusive labor practice to 
corrupt human resource management” (Tan, 2009, p. 174). Take, for example, the case of 
a MNE who bribes local environmental officials to overlook an environmental violation, 
rather than investing in a CSR-enhancing control that could have prevented the pollution 
issue in the first place. By leaning on corrupt practices in place of socially responsible 
ones, the MNE may effectively increase its risk of producing irresponsible outcomes.  
Second, when corruption is deeply embedded in a given society, MNE managers may 
want to avoid damaging the firm’s reputation by associating too closely with known corrupt 
public officials. Luo (2006) suggests that this may result in the use of more arms-length 
relationship management techniques in highly corrupt environments. These arms-length 
strategies may hamper the firm’s ability to clearly understand and respond appropriately to 
stakeholders’ specific social responsibility expectations and priorities (Matten & Moon, 
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2008). This lack of stakeholder engagement can lead the firm to make decisions contrary to 
local moral norms (Greenwood, 2007), thus increasing the risks and costs of CSiR for the 
firm. 
Third, economic and competitive pressures associated with corrupt business 
practices may also result in socially irresponsible behavior. Operating in corrupt 
environments adds direct and indirect transaction costs that the firm must contend with 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). For example, “companies that are 
burdened with ‘under-the-table payments’ will try to contain their costs by cutting 
corners” (Nwabuzor, 2005, p. 129). The costs associated with operating in highly corrupt 
environments are more uncertain (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). This cost uncertainty 
contributes to the lower levels of foreign direct investment in countries high in corruption 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2001, 2002). 
If a MNE’s competitors utilize corrupt business practices, the MNE may be 
influenced to likewise participate in CSiR behavior to maintain its industry 
competitiveness (Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). This represents a form of organizational 
isomorphism, driving homogeneity of firm behavior, including corruption and associated 
irresponsibility (Venard & Hanafi, 2008). Extreme economic and competitive pressures 
that threaten the firm’s survival may further increase the likelihood that the firm will 
pursue irresponsible actions to remain viable (Campbell, 2007). 
Finally, MNEs with a history and culture that accepts and expects regular corrupt 
interactions with public officials may find unethical behavior has become instantiated 
within the organization. Firms that operate in environments with strong formal 
institutional pressures to participate in corruption through bribery, for example, may find 
corrupt practices have become rationalized and deeply embedded within the organization 
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(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004). These MNEs may find themselves susceptible to 
lowering their home country standards to meet other local societal norms and pressures, 
some of which may represent unethical and socially irresponsible behavior in the eyes of 
stakeholders. Institutionalized corruption “can become an integral part of day-to-day 
activities to such an extent that individuals may be unable to see the inappropriateness of 
their behaviors” (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 4).  
This discussion highlights a multitude of reasons why pervasive corruption in a 
MNE’s public sector interactions may increase the firm’s likelihood of acting in a 
socially irresponsible way. Formal corruption may influence MNEs to lower firm 
standards that could prevent CSiR. Also, in distancing themselves from corrupt public 
officials, MNE managers may overlook or misunderstand local stakeholder social 
responsibility expectations, increasing the risk of committing acts of CSiR. Furthermore, 
because of the additional costs of corruption combined with the pressures of having 
competitors using corrupt methods may further lead MNEs down the path toward 
irresponsibility. And when the corrupt practices dominate the firm’s dealings with public 
officials on a consistent basis, the corruption may become embedded in the 
organizational culture, generally desensitizing the organization to the ethical implications 
of corrupt public sector behavior. For these reasons, firms operating in high FCEs may 
find themselves initiating or tolerating more actions that are socially irresponsible. Thus, 
I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: MNEs operating in location portfolios containing higher formal 
corruption environments on average have higher levels of CSiR. 
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Informal Corruption Environments and Firm Social Irresponsibility 
Like other aspects of the institutional environment, corruption also has an 
informal component. Informal corruption extends beyond the corrupt practices within the 
formal, state-driven institutions of the countries with which corporations may interact. 
Corruption may also be found in varying extents within the everyday experiences of the 
average individual citizen of a society (Riaño, Heinrich, & Hodess, 2010). Some 
environments have a stronger overall culture of corruption that permeates the everyday 
life of its members. I refer to the socio-cultural nature of corruption as the informal 
corruption environment (ICE).  
Sociology recognizes that the essence of corruption is found in its social and 
cultural foundations (Luo, 2005). “Social structures inhibit, enable, and stimulate people 
to commit corruption, and may even force people into corruption” (Nieuwenboer & 
Kaptein, 2008, p. 134). A history of broadly-based corrupt practices may result in a 
higher overall penetration of corruption within the country’s collective experience. This 
corruption may span beyond interactions within formal governmental bodies and be 
found in private sector businesses, educational systems, the media, religious groups, non-
governmental agencies, as well as personal exchanges.  
In countries with a higher ICE, corruption may become expected not only in the 
formal interactions with public officials and governmental processes, but also in the 
society’s informal interactions as well. This is important to MNEs because firms’ local 
interactions are not limited to only formal institutional actors such as governmental 
agents. Firms also interact with the general public within the countries in which they 
operate, such as in their dealings with local employees, customers, suppliers, etc.  
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More informal pressure to act corruptly in everyday life can permeate the firm’s 
general interactions and may act as a strong institutional cue within the firm’s ICE. 
Informal corruption can become institutionalized to the point where it becomes routine 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003). If employees have grown acclimated to general living 
conditions characterized by high, widespread informal corruption in their everyday lives, 
they may become socialized into the corruption to the point where they do not necessarily 
object to participating in it in business contexts (Anand, et al., 2004).  
For example, a MNE may open a factory in a country in which child labor is not 
necessarily seen as socially irresponsible in terms of the local cultural norms. Although 
child labor may not be seen as irresponsible in-country, outside it would be considered a 
CSiR violation. Because of the local pervasiveness of child labor, the new factory 
managers may be tempted to utilize this locally-accepted practice, unless the MNE 
proactively restricts its use.  
In summary, the general level of informal corruption permeating the MNE’s 
operating environment can impact the firm’s employees, customers, and stakeholders, de-
sensitizing them to the negative implications of corrupt practices and influencing the 
firm’s likelihood to participate in CSiR. Firms in locations with low ICE may find 
themselves at an advantage over firms in high ICE environments. Employees and 
customers of low ICE firms may not be as conditioned to expect and participate in 
widespread instances of corrupt transactions, thus reducing the likelihood they will 
initiate or participate in corrupt and irresponsible behavior in a business context. On the 
other hand, firms in high ICE locations are operating with human resources that have 
been acclimated to expect corruption everywhere. Because it permeates their daily lives 
in a variety of ways, when it appears in business dealings it is neither a surprise nor a 
106 
 
1
0
6 106 
1
0
6 106 106 106 106  
1
0
6 106 
hindrance, increasing their likelihood to participate in corrupt and irresponsible behavior. 
Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: MNEs operating in location portfolios containing higher informal 
corruption environments on average have higher levels of CSiR. 
 
 
Corporate Social Irresponsibility and Firm Performance 
The prior hypotheses predict positive relationships between the formal and 
informal corruption environments of the MNE’s operating portfolio and the firm’s 
corresponding level of CSiR. But why should firms care about social irresponsibility? For 
example, do firms with higher or lower levels of CSiR perform better than other firms? 
This study explores this normative question. I posit that higher levels of social 
irresponsibility can negatively influence a MNE’s performance. 
There is some evidence in the CSR literature that higher levels of firm corporate 
social performance (CSP) may be positively related to better corporate financial 
performance (CFP). In a review of the academic and practitioner CSP-CFP literature, 
Peloza (2009) confirmed that 63% of the studies had found a positive relationship 
between CSP and CFP. These results are consistent with other meta-analyses, which also 
found that higher levels of firm social responsibility were related to better financial 
performance (Margolis, et al., 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, et al., 2003; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
Only a small number of studies have specifically examined the performance 
implications of social irresponsibility. These studies tend to focus on event analyses of 
irresponsibility incidents and firm value. For example, in their meta-analysis of the CSP-
CFP literature, Margolis et al. (2009) identified 28 prior studies which measured the 
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stock market impacts associated with the public announcement of specific social 
irresponsibility incidents, what they termed ‘revealed misdeeds’, such as regulatory 
violations, fines, lawsuits, arrests, involuntary recalls, etc. Their findings confirmed that 
news of irresponsibility has a negative effect on firm value.  
Similar findings were confirmed previously by Frooman (1997) in his meta-
analysis of irresponsibility event studies. Reports of socially irresponsible events or illicit 
corporate behavior resulted in decreases in shareholder wealth. Frooman points out that 
while his analysis cannot necessarily confirm why this dynamic occurs (is a penalty being 
imposed on ethical or more economic grounds?), it does reveal that the market reacts 
negatively to CSiR.  
Additionally, there is evidence that the negative impacts of irresponsibility can be 
stronger than any positive impacts of responsible behavior. Doh et al. (2010) found some 
initial empirical support for this notion when examining the stock price impacts 
associated with firm additions and removals from social responsibility stock indexes. 
Removal acts as a signal of corporate irresponsibility and is associated with a greater 
(negative) effect on shareholder wealth than any corresponding effects related to being 
added to an index. Thus, past CSiR studies tend to find that “doing bad, if discovered, has 
a more pronounced effect on financial performance than doing good” (Margolis, et al., 
2009, p. 23). 
In addition to the signaling or disclosure arguments, I suggest there may be other 
reasons that firms high in CSiR will perform poorly. First, social irresponsibility can add 
risks and costs that may negatively affect the firm’s performance. Acting irresponsibly in 
conflict with stakeholders’ CSR expectations, such as violating particular environmental 
or human rights standards, may expose the firm to risks and costs associated with civil 
108 
 
1
0
8 108 
1
0
8 108 108 108 108  
1
0
8 108 
lawsuits and criminal litigation (deMaCarty, 2009). A well-publicized track record of 
irresponsibility may prevent the firm from obtaining capital at consistent rates (McGuire, 
Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988). Or firms may face large-scale consumer boycotts due to 
CSiR which negatively affect the firm’s brand reputation and sales (Becker-Olsen, 
Cudmore, & Hill, 2006).  
Much of the activity driving these additional costs is often spurred by private 
political pressure exerted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the rise of which 
is “one of the most significant developments in international affairs over the past 20 
years” (Doh & Guay, 2006, p. 51). Consumer watchdog organizations may utilize a 
“name-and-shame” strategy to publicize incidents of corporate irresponsibility (Becker-
Olsen, et al., 2006), a NGO tactic that was used to effectively to advance the anti-
sweatshop movement in the 1990’s (Bartley & Child, 2010). This risk may be 
particularly pertinent to larger firms, whose higher profile makes them a more likely 
target of NGO action (Godfrey, et al., 2009). Once the firm’s perceived CSiR has been 
exposed in this fashion, the firm may need to address the harm that has been caused to 
their stakeholders (Campbell, 2007), increasing their costs and subsequently reducing 
performance.  
Second, irresponsible behavior may also open the firm up to increased likelihood 
of governmental regulatory intervention to which the firm will have to respond (Orlitzky 
& Benjamin, 2001). Just as the private political pressure exerted by NGOs highlight 
corporate irresponsibility, governments may likewise exert public political pressure to 
force the corporation to address irresponsible behavior (Reid & Toffel, 2009). This may 
involve fines or other regulatory actions. For example, “if a firm fails to meet promises to 
government officials in regard to actions that affect the environment (dumping, etc.), 
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government agencies may find it necessary to pass more stringent regulations…to force 
the firm to act in a socially responsible manner” (McGuire, et al., 1988, p. 856).  
Regulatory or legislative risks may also be embedded in other NGO actions. For 
example, citing shareholder resolutions at Hartford Financial Services Group and CVS 
Caremark Corporation, Reid and Toffel (2009) point out that it is not uncommon for 
shareholder resolutions to include implicit or explicit regulatory threats as a means to 
motivate corporate compliance with activist causes. Irresponsible firms may be left to 
face the additional expense of implementing costly changes to correct their irresponsible 
practices or potentially paying government-imposed fines and penalties associated with 
non-compliance.  
Third, after a high-profile irresponsible event or after earning a reputation for 
irresponsibility (such as having the irresponsible behavior called out by a third-party 
social responsibility rating agency or index), stakeholders may lose trust in the firm. A 
lack of trust can degrade stakeholders’ commitment to the firm, damaging sales (Berman, 
Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999) .  
Not only does firm performance suffer from this decrease in sales, but the firm 
may also need to expend additional resources and incur additional costs to enhance the 
firm’s social responsibility image and reputation and to address and prevent recurrence of 
the irresponsible behavior (Arjoon, 2005). For example, firms may utilize resources to 
make new investments in corporate governance in the “hope that corporate governance 
will restore trust in business” (Rossouw, 2005, p. 37).  
 A case in point can be seen when Shell Oil radically changed its approach to 
corporate governance following a very public and negative Greenpeace campaign against 
announcing a plan to dump its Brent Spar offshore oil rig into the North Sea in 1995, an 
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action that was deemed as environmentally irresponsible by the activists (Backer, 2007). 
But these reactive measures to re-establish a socially responsible reputation with 
stakeholders are not without incremental cost to the firm. 
Finally, irresponsible behavior can affect the firm’s legitimacy with key 
stakeholders. Social responsibility can be used strategically to achieve legitimacy, 
effectively becoming a foundation of the firm’s social license to operate (Chiu & 
Sharfman, 2011). Violations of social responsibility legitimacy threaten this license to 
operate or even potentially the firm’s long-term survival (Bansal & Roth, 2000).  
The legitimacy argument can also be extended to an internal stakeholder group, 
the firm’s employees. “Organizations’ socially responsible or irresponsible acts are of 
serious consequence to employees” (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007, p. 
843). Destroying goodwill and legitimacy through CSiR can lead to difficulties in 
attracting and retaining the best employees, leading to a cycle of service degradation 
which can ultimately impact performance (deMaCarty, 2009). These dynamics all 
reinforce the importance of establishing and maintaining legitimacy with external and 
internal stakeholders and highlight the potential performance consequences of losing 
legitimacy through social irresponsibility. 
In summary, I propose that just as firms are rewarded for their CSR, they may be 
penalized for CSiR. Not only can irresponsible behavior add risks and costs associated 
with dealing with NGO anti-irresponsibility activism, but firms may also face costly 
exposure to regulatory threats and governmental actions related to their CSiR. Reacting 
to incidents and patterns of CSiR can drain precious firm resources that could be invested 
elsewhere. Finally, a pattern of irresponsibility can put the firm’s “license to operate” at 
risk and may damage the firms’ legitimacy in the eyes of its key stakeholders, reducing 
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the firm’s financial viability. For the above reasons firms with higher CSiR do not 
perform as well as firms that do not have to contend with social irresponsibility:  
Hypothesis 3: MNEs with higher levels of social irresponsibility on average have 
lower performance than MNEs with lower levels of social irresponsibility. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
Secondary data were used to test the hypotheses in a multinational context. The 
sample frame for this study was the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics 
(KLD, now part of MSCI Inc.) social responsibility rating data. KLD publishes a series 
of binary strength and weakness indicators in a variety of CSR categories and is 
considered a defacto standard for social responsibility research (Hart & Sharfman, 2012; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Wood, 2010). Because KLD reports both firm social 
responsibility strengths and weaknesses (concerns) separately (as opposed to only 
providing a “net” continuous variable rating reflecting “overall” firm social 
responsibility), it has been used in prior studies to investigate social irresponsibility 
(Doh, et al., 2010; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Strike, et al., 
2006).  
An initial sample of 700 firms was randomly selected from the 2011 KLD social 
responsibility ratings dataset. The target sample size of 700 was calculated based on the 
total number of individual items that are modeled in the analysis and the recommended 
desirable (high-end) observation to variable ratio of 20:1 (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2010, p. 176). Only one firm in the initial sample had to be dropped per lack 
of available subsidiary data, and the final sample size of 699 firms was retained for the 
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analysis. The final sample was comprised of a total of 72,635 firm-location 
observations. 
 
Dependent Variable  
Following other social responsibility studies, both operating performance and firm 
value were used to measure the dependent variable in this study, firm performance 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Operating performance was measured via two commonly-
used performance measures. The first performance measure was Return on assets 
(ROA), the ratio of net income to total assets. This accounting-based indicator has been 
found to most closely correlate with social performance in prior social responsibility 
research (Orlitzky, et al., 2003). Performance was also measured via Tobin’s q, a 
forward-looking market-based indicator of firm value that incorporates firm equity, as 
well as preferred stock and debt and reflects the intangible value investors assign to a 
company (Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, & Koedijk, 2011). Market-based approaches are the 
most commonly used method of measuring financial performance in social responsibility 
research (Peloza, 2009).  
 
Endogenous Variable 
CSiR is both a dependent and independent (endogenous) variable in this research 
model. Prior empirical research has tended to use one of two different methods to 
measure firm social irresponsibility: 1) occurrences of negative social responsibility-
related actions or events; or 2) third-party ratings of firm irresponsibility levels. The first 
method is typically used in event analyses that are focused on examining a performance 
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impact in the aftermath of a specific CSiR-related incident (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; 
Frooman, 1997).  
However, in this study I am interested in a firm’s overall pattern of socially 
irresponsible behavior, as opposed to analyzing the occurrence or impact of particular 
irresponsibility events. For this reason, I selected the second CSiR measurement method 
mentioned above, aggregating irresponsibility rating data available in the KLD dataset. 
The KLD data is widely used in general social responsibility research, and its construct 
validity as a measure has been confirmed (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Sharfman, 1996). 
KLD is also the primary data source of choice in the majority of studies that specifically 
examine social irresponsibility (Doh, et al., 2010; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; McGuire, 
et al., 2003; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Strike, et al., 2006). 
One reason for the popular use of KLD to measure CSiR is because KLD 
publishes discrete ratings of both firms’ “good” CSR (‘strengths’) and “bad” CSiR 
(‘concerns’) in a variety of social responsibility categories, including environment, 
community, human rights, employee relations, diversity, and product. KLD’s separate 
consideration of strengths and concerns enables researchers to focus on one or both of 
these social responsibility dimensions, depending on the research model. 
Therefore, each firm’s CSiR in this study was calculated via the identical 
technique and data source used in prior studies (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Doh, et al., 
2010; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; McGuire, et al., 2003; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; 
Strike, et al., 2006). To calculate each firm’s overall CSiR score I summed binary 
concerns indicators in the KLD dataset for each firm. The specific irresponsibility items 
included in this study are summarized in Table 3.1. This summation of concerns 
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resulted in a single interval measure of social irresponsibility for each firm, where zero 
represents no CSiR, and higher numbers indicate higher levels of CSiR. 
 
TABLE 3.1. KLD social irresponsibility weakness items representing firm CSiR 
Category Weakness  Category Weakness 
Environment Regulatory problems  Employee 
relations 
Union relations 
Substantial emissions Health & safety concerns 
Climate change Supply chain controversies 
Negative product impact Labor-management relations 
Land use & biodiversity Diversity Workforce diversity issues 
Non-carbon emissions Representation 
Other env’l concern Board of directors diversity 
Community Community impact Product Product safety 
Human rights Burma concern Marketing/contracting issue 
Sudan concern Antitrust 
Other concern Other product concern 
 
 
Independent Variables  
The formal and informal corruption environment independent variables were 
measured at the portfolio level, adapting a portfolio measurement technique used in prior 
international business studies (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 
2010; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997; Kim & Park, 2002; Nachum & Song, 2011; Zaheer 
& Hernandez, 2011). Portfolio-level measurements were calculated by averaging country 
attributes for each MNE headquarters and subsidiary location. This resulted in a weighted 
average value for each firm, weighted by the number of locations the MNE has in each 
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country. This same technique was used to calculate both the MNE portfolio formal 
corruption environment and informal corruption environment values.  
 
Portfolio informal corruption environment (ICE): The ICE reflects the degree of 
general permeation of corruption into a society’s culture and everyday life. The ICE 
reflects the everyday citizen’s general impressions and experiences at an individual, not 
necessarily government-corporate, level. Thus, the ICE is measured using general public 
views of corruption, as opposed to international business people and country expert 
opinions.  
This informal, socio-cultural dimension of corruption is rarely included as a 
distinct corruption measure. One reason for this is that a lack of cross-national measures 
that reflect this deeper cultural penetration of corruption beyond public sector interactions 
has hampered empirical investigations in this area (You & Khagram, 2005). Despite the 
relative scarcity of studies incorporating informal corruption measures, one method of 
measuring informal corruption levels can be found in the Transparency International 
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) dataset1. Based on interviews with more than 
91,500 people in 86 countries, the GCB reflects the general public’s perception of the 
permeation of corruption across a variety of institutions in their country (Riaño, et al., 
2010). 
                                                          
1 The World Values Survey (WVS) was also considered as an alternative measure of informal corruption in 
this study. The WVS contains items that capture the degree to which the general public feels a variety of 
potentially unethical behaviors are justifiable, such as cheating on taxes, not paying a bus or train fare, and 
accepting a bribe, that could also be considered indicators of informal corruption pervasiveness. Two 
reasons led to the selection of the GCB over WVS. First, GCB’s coverage of countries relevant to this 
study was superior to WVS’. WVS was missing data for the specific items of interest in several countries 
including Denmark, Ireland, and Austria. Additionally, the WVS is conducted in waves that survey 
different countries at different points in time over a 25+ year time period. Because all of other data 
elements in this study represent a particular point in time (2009-11), the GCB was considered more 
comparable to the measurement model and was selected over the WVS. 
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As summarized in Table 3.2, the GCB uses a 5-point Likert-style scale where 1 
means not at all corrupt and 5 means extremely corrupt to measure the extent to which 
citizens perceive corruption affects eleven different institutional elements in their 
country.  
 
TABLE 3.2 Perceptual informal corruption items on Global Corruption Barometer 
To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this 
country to be affected by corruption on a scale from 1 to 5  
(1 meaning not at all corrupt and 5 meaning extremely corrupt): 
Political parties 
Parliament/legislature 
Police 
Business/private sector 
Public officials/civil servants 
Judiciary 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) 
Media 
Religious bodies 
Military 
Education system 
 
 
Although the questions on the GCB are primarily based on public sector (formal) 
institutions, the measures themselves can be considered to reflect the informal dimension 
of corruption because the respondents who are answering the question represent the 
general population and average citizens. In contrast to other measures that focus on 
corruption practices in the formal sector, the GCB is not designed to reflect expert 
opinions on government-corporate corruption levels, but rather the average citizen’s 
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general exposure to corruption. This directly supports ICE’s focus on the general cultural 
permeation of corruption into the general public’s everyday experience.  
The Cronbach’s alpha for the eleven GCB corruption perception items was .873 
indicating an acceptable level of reliability. The eleven items for each country were 
averaged to calculate average national informal corruption levels. Each MNE’s overall 
portfolio ICE was then calculated by averaging the national informal corruption level of 
each of the firm’s headquarters and subsidiary locations.  
 
Portfolio formal corruption environment (FCE): FCE reflects corrupt behavior 
and expectations that firm managers may be confronted with related to commercial 
transactions with a country’s public sector officials, such as in procuring government 
services associated with establishing and maintaining local operations and resources. 
Each MNE’s overall portfolio FCE was calculated by averaging the national formal 
corruption level of each firm headquarters and subsidiary location.  
Corruption in the public sector is measured in a variety of different ways in 
international business studies. There are almost two dozen different data sources 
measuring cross-national levels of institutionalized formal corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2006). To help researchers and practitioners sort through this maze of 
choices, Kaufmann et al. (2006) suggest several ways to effectively measure corruption. 
One method of measuring corruption is via perceptions of relevant stakeholders. “Since 
corruption usually leaves no paper trail, perceptions of corruption based on individuals' 
actual experiences are sometimes the best, and the only, information we have” 
(Kaufmann, et al., 2006, p. 2). A second method of measuring corruption is via assessing 
the quality of institutions that control corruption. This study combines elements of both 
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of these approaches, perceptual and institutional, to create a single robust measure of 
each country’s formal corruption levels that was used to calculate each firm’s portfolio 
FCE. The selection of the specific perceptual and institutional elements to support this 
multi-dimensional measure of formal corruption is explained below. 
The perceptual aspect of my formal corruption measure was determined via 
Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI 
aggregates expert and business opinion survey results to reflect the level of administrative 
and political corruption in 178 different countries. CPI scores are assigned based on a 10-
point interval scale where 0 indicates a highly corrupt government and a 10 indicates low 
levels of public sector corruption. 
The CPI is selected over other cross-national corruption perceptions such as the 
Freedom House political rights index, Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk 
Guide index of corruption, or the Black Market Activity Index, because of the CPI’s 
more pervasive use in the international business literature. The CPI has been recognized 
as being used most extensively to measure formal corruption in cross-national research 
(Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 2001; Voyer & Beamish, 2004; 
Weitzel & Berns, 2006; You & Khagram, 2005). It has been found to be a robust measure 
of corruption (Husted, 1999) with confirmed construct validity (Voyer & Beamish, 2004; 
Wilhelm, 2002), making it an appropriate selection for the perceptive dimension of 
formal corruption in this international business study. 
Transparency International codes its raw CPI data in such a way that a lower CPI 
score actually reflects a higher level of corruption. To aid in interpretation and remain 
consistent with prior corruption studies (Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; 
Robertson & Watson, 2004), country CPI scores were reverse coded and rescaled by 
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multiplying each country’s score by -1 (to reverse code) and adding +10 to each (to 
create a positive range) before being incorporated into my formal corruption measure. 
This produces a more consistent transformed CPI scale where 10 indicates high 
administrative and political corruption and 0 indicates low levels of administrative and 
political corruption. 
Following Kaufmann (2006), the second aspect of my formal corruption variable 
incorporates measurements of key institutional influences that are directly related to the 
control of corruption. These items “do not measure actual corruption, but can provide 
useful indications of the possibility of corruption” (Kaufmann, et al., 2006, p. 2). 
Countries that implement and enforce more stringent anti-corruption regulatory controls 
can limit the incentives and opportunities for corrupt behavior, curtailing the levels of 
formal sector corruption.  
I incorporated the influence of formal corruption-constraining institutions via the 
2010 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which are available for over 
200 countries and subsequently widely applied in international business research 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). These indicators represent the aggregation of hundreds of 
governance data variables from 31 different data sources (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009, 2010). Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) points out that because the WGI data 
aggregation is accomplished via a precision-weighted, unobserved components model, 
the noise of single indicators is reduced, further enhancing the indicators’ value as 
composite measures of institutional governance. 
Three WGI indicators that specifically focus on governance practices most 
relevant to corruption were used as part of the formal corruption measurement in this 
study. First, the WGI control of corruption (CC) indicator speaks directly to the issue of 
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public sector corruption and reflects incentives or disincentives for corrupt practices to 
flourish in the country. Second, the WGI government effectiveness (GE) indicator reflects 
the independence of public services from political pressures as well as the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to stated policies, what has been called its “unbribe-
ability,”(Langbein & Knack, 2008, p. 5). Finally, WGI’s regulatory quality (RQ) 
indicator assesses whether barriers in public-private transactions have been erected that 
enable corrupt practices to occur or whether the regulatory environment fosters healthy 
private sector growth.  
Each of the WGI indicators range from -2.5 to +2.5, where -2.5 indicates weak 
governance and +2.5 indicates a strong control. This results in the situation where higher 
raw WGI values reflect stronger country institutional controls, which in turn reflect an 
environment where less corruption would be expected. To maintain consistency and 
eliminate potential confusion, a reverse code/rescale transformation similar to that 
applied to the CPI was applied to the WGI values. WGI indicators were transformed by 
multiplying each by -1 (to reverse code) and adding 2.5 to each (to rescale into a non-
negative range) before being incorporated into the formal corruption measure. The 
resulting transformed scale ranges from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates an environment with 
fewer opportunities for formal corruption because of the high governance controls, and 5 
indicates a high likelihood of formal corruption because of the lack of controls.  
The single perceptual corruption item (CPI) and the three institutional corruption 
items (WGI CC, GE, and RQ) were used to calculate an overall level of formal 
corruption for each country. Because these elements are conceptually very close to each 
other (Langbein & Knack, 2008), there was high correlation expected and confirmed 
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amongst the four formal corruption components. Therefore, I used factor analysis to 
create and confirm the validity of a single formal corruption level factor for each country.  
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to create the FCE formal corruption 
factor. To show that FCE is measuring a phenomenon that is distinct from the ICE 
informal corruption variable, I incorporated the four formal corruption environment 
variables as well as the informal corruption perception variable into a single EFA. 
Variables were standardized prior to factor analysis. The results of the EFA are 
summarized in Table 3.3.  
The EFA results yielded the expected two factor solution where the four formal 
corruption items loaded on one factor, and the informal corruption variable loaded on its 
own factor. Varimax rotation confirmed all four FCE items (CPI, WGI GE, WGI RQ, 
and WGI CC) loaded on a single factor as expected, and the ICE item (GCB) loaded on a 
second factor. The EFA produced an eigenvalue = 3.953 explaining 98.87% of the 
variance and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity (p < .001). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) exceeded the required .50 threshold (.659), and 
all communalities met the recommended .50 rule-of-thumb. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
four FCE items was .993, suggesting an acceptable level of reliability, and the 
Cronbach’s alpha was not improved by the removal of any of the items. All item-to-total 
correlations exceeded the minimum .50 level, and inter-item correlations exceeded the 
recommended .30 threshold. Thus, the EFA results support the use of the FCE factor to 
represent portfolio formal corruption environment in the regression analyses. 
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TABLE 3.3. Exploratory factor analysis formal corruption environment (FCE) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
CPI – Corruption Perception Index (formal) .994 -.045 
WGI GE – Government effectiveness (formal) .983 -.128 
WGI RQ – Regulatory quality (formal) .977 -.161 
WGI CC – Control of corruption (formal) .995 .024 
GCB – Global Corruption Barometer (informal) -.074 .997 
 
 
Control Variables 
Prior studies have found firm size to be a strong predictor of social responsibility 
and irresponsibility (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Strike, et al., 2006; Udayasankar, 2008). 
Therefore, this study controlled for Firm size, measured via the log of the number of 
employees. Following Barnea and Rubin (2010), Firm experience was measured by the 
number of years since the firm’s founding.  
Prior social responsibility research has also found that degree of international 
diversification may influence MNE CSiR (Strike, et al., 2006). Therefore, I included two 
variables to control for the scope of the firm’s international activities from the prior CSiR 
research. First, I controlled for the count of the distinct Number of countries within 
which the firm is operating (headquarters or subsidiary locations). The firm’s 
international scope was also measured by counting the number of Foreign subsidiaries 
within the MNE’s operations. Additionally, because social responsibility standards vary 
between different countries (Maignan & Ralston, 2002), a firm’s home country CSR 
standards may influence whether or not the firm participates in irresponsible behavior. 
Therefore, I included a dummy variable in my CSiR analysis to control for differences in 
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firm headquarters country. Because 85% of the sample frame firms are headquartered in 
the U.S., I coded the dummy variable Home country as a 0 if the firm is U.S.-based and a 
1 if the firm is headquartered in any other country.  
Because there are indications in the social responsibility literature that the 
strength of firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) is related to firm corporate 
financial performance (Margolis, et al., 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, et al., 
2003; Peloza, 2009), I also controlled for firm CSR in my evaluation of the CSiR-
performance relationship. Consistent with prior social responsibility studies (Chatterji & 
Toffel, 2010; Doh, et al., 2010; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; McGuire, et al., 2003; Muller 
& Kräussl, 2011; Strike, et al., 2006), firm CSR values were calculated by summing 30 
binary strengths indicators in the 2011 KLD dataset indicated in Table 3.4 for each firm. 
This summation results in a single interval measure of CSR for each firm, represented by 
a range of possible values from 0 to 30, where a higher number indicates higher levels of 
firm social responsibility.  
Prior comparative analysis in an international setting has indicated that industry 
norms may affect firm social responsibility strategies (Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & 
Rupp, 2006). Therefore, following Klapper and Love (2004) I controlled for industry in 
my analysis of firm performance. Utilizing Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ’s 
industry sectors, Industry dummy variables were coded for the following sectors: 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, 
information technology, materials, telecommunication services, and utilities.  
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TABLE 3.4. KLD social responsibility strength items representing firm CSR 
Category Strength  Category Strength 
Environment Beneficial products   Employee 
relations 
Union relations 
Pollution prevention Cash profit sharing 
Recycling Employee involvement 
Clean energy Health and safety 
Management systems Supply chain policies/pgms 
Other env’l strengths Other benefits & programs 
Community Charitable giving Diversity Representation 
Innovative giving Board of Directors 
Community engagement Work/life benefits 
Other comm strengths Women & minority  
Human rights Indigenous relations Gay & lesbian policies 
Human rights initiatives  Employs underrepresented 
Product Product quality Other diversity strengths 
Benefits to disadvantaged Governance Reporting quality 
Access to capital Public policy 
 
 
Additionally, following other CSP-CFP research (Jo & Harjoto, 2011) firm 
Leverage, a ratio of firm debt to equity, was also included as a control in my performance 
analysis. Data for all control variables with the exception of the CSR variable were 
obtained from the S&P Capital IQ database. All variable definitions and data sources are 
summarized in Table 3.5. 
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TABLE 3.5. Variables, measures, and sources of data  
 Variable Measure Source 
Variables 
of interest 
CSiR Continuous variable measuring the degree of 
firm irresponsibility, from 0 (low) to 22 (high) 
2011 KLD CSiR 
weakness indicators  
ROA (%) Accounting-based measure of operating 
performance; ratio of income to assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
Tobin’s q Market-based measure of firm value; market-
to-book ratio incorporating equity, preferred 
stock, and debt 
S&P Capital IQ 
Informal 
Corruption 
Environment ICE) 
Measure of the permeation of corruption in the 
everyday lives of the general public in the 
countries that comprise the MNE portfolio 
2010 TI Global 
Corruption 
Barometer  
Variables 
that 
comprise 
FCE 
factor 
Control of 
corruption (CC) 
Indicator of extent to which public power 
exercised for private gain is controlled in the 
countries that comprise the MNE portfolio, 
from 0 (strong corruption control) to 5 (weak 
corruption controls)  
World Bank World 
Governance 
Indicators 2010 
(rescaled) 
Regulatory quality 
(RQ) 
Indicator of extent to which governments 
implement sound policies to support private 
development in the countries that comprise the 
MNE portfolio, from 0 (strong regulatory 
quality) to 5 (weak regulatory quality) 
World Bank World 
Governance 
Indicators 2010 
(rescaled) 
Government 
effectiveness (GE) 
Indicator of quality of public services and 
policies and credibility of government 
commitment to such policies in the countries 
that comprise the MNE portfolio, from 0 
(highly effective) to 5 (low effectiveness) 
World Bank World 
Governance 
Indicators 2010 
(rescaled) 
Administrative 
and political 
corruption (CPI) 
Indicator of level of public sector corruption in 
the countries that comprise the MNE portfolio, 
from 1 (very little government corruption) to 
10 (very corrupt government) 
TI Corruption 
Perception Index 
2010 (rescaled) 
Control 
variables 
Firm size Natural log of number of employees S&P Capital IQ 
Firm experience  Age of firm, years since founding S&P Capital IQ 
Number countries Indicator of international scope measured by 
number of distinct countries in which the firm 
has a headquarters &/or subsidiary location(s) 
S&P Capital IQ 
Foreign 
subsidiaries 
Indicator of international scope measured by 
number of foreign subsidiaries 
S&P Capital IQ 
Home country Dummy indicator where 0 indicates U.S.-based 
firm and 1 indicates HQ in any other country 
S&P Capital IQ 
CSR Continuous variable measuring degree of firm 
social responsibility, from 0 (low) to 30 (high) 
2011 KLD CSR 
strength indicators 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total equity S&P Capital IQ 
Industry Dummy indicators for 7 industry sectors S&P Capital IQ 
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RESULTS 
Because CSiR is an endogenous variable in this research model, the hypotheses 
were tested using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The reasoning for utilizing 
this method as opposed to the more commonly applied ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression is as follows. One of the underlying assumptions behind OLS regression is 
independence of the error terms (Hair, et al., 2010, p. 185). Models with independent 
variables that are endogenous, that is variables that are influenced by other variables in 
the model, can produce inconsistent and misleading results (Antonakis, Bendahan, 
Jacquart, & Lalive, in press). OLS results under conditions of endogeneity can be 
susceptible to bad estimates, biased coefficients, and potentially inaccurate interpretations 
(Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009). Missing variables and/or measurement errors in the 
dependent variable might result in endogeneity problems and error term correlation 
(Shaver, 2005).  
Therefore, to minimize the impact of endogeneity on my regression results, I 
utilized the 2SLS method in this study. The benefit of 2SLS is that it addresses the 
possibility of error correlation, but it “does not preclude the possibility that the errors will 
be found not to correlate” (Shaver, 2005, p. 341). Therefore, it represents a cautionary 
and proactive method of testing the hypotheses as a system under conditions of probable 
endogeneity. 
The 2SLS technique was conducted via a system of two regression equations. A 
set of Stage 1 equations were used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, regressing firm CSiR 
against the MNE portfolio formal (FCE) and informal corruption environments (ICE), 
respectively. Predicted CSiR values were saved from the Stage 1 regression and used as 
the independent variable in Stage 2. Using the Predicted CSiR values addresses the 
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endogeneity concern because Predicted CSiR values are correlated with the original CSiR 
values, but are not correlated with the error terms. The Stage 2 equation of the 2SLS 
analysis was used to test Hypothesis 3, regressing firm financial performance (ROA and 
Tobin’s q, separately) against the firm’s Predicted CSiR values from Stage 1.  
To confirm the methodological selection of 2SLS for this study, I conducted a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests whether the Stage 2 
regression using the (instrumental) Predicted CSiR values saved from Stage 1 and the 
Stage 2 regression using the (OLS) actual CSiR values results in a statistically significant 
difference between the coefficients for the actual CSiR and Predicted CSiR variables. 
Under conditions of endogeneity, the OLS-based estimates will be biased (based on a 
correlation between the error terms and the predicted dependent variable that violates the 
assumptions for OLS), resulting in a significant difference in the regression results using 
2SLS and OLS methods. In this scenario, proceeding with the 2SLS method utilizing the 
instrumental (Predicted CSiR) values is preferred. If endogeneity is not indicated, the 
OLS- and instrumental-based results will not differ significantly.  
Because this study uses two different measures of firm performance, ROA and 
Tobin’s q, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test must be conducted for each dependent variable. 
The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in this study did not indicate a statistically 
significant difference between 2SLS and OLS coefficients using ROA as the dependent 
variable (t = 1.30). However, the results did find a statistically significant difference 
between 2SLS (using the instrumental variable) and OLS for the dependent variable 
Tobin’s q (t = 2.34, p < 0.05). Based on the overall test results, the null hypothesis that 
CSiR is exogenous was rejected. Because the Tobin’s q test indicated endogeneity and the 
ROA test was inconclusive (producing similar results under both OLS and 2SLS), the use 
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of the 2SLS technique utilizing the instrumental Predicted CSiR values was confirmed 
for use in this study. 
The directional hypotheses in this study support the use of one-tailed tests for all 
regressions (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Table 3.6 summarizes the descriptive statistics and 
correlations of variables in the study sample. An inspection of the bivariate correlations 
confirmed that none of the significant correlations between independent variables 
exceeded the 0.70 co-linearity guidelines (Hair, et al., 2010, pp. 204-205). However, 
several significant correlations with control variables approached, though did not exceed, 
the recommended threshold: Number of countries and Foreign subsidiaries (r = .658); 
Number of countries and Portfolio ICE (r = -.628); and CSR and Firm size (r = .595). The 
two measures of the dependent variable in this study, ROA and Tobin’s q, were also 
relatively highly correlated (r =.568). 
Because of the instances of some relatively high bivariate correlations, variance 
inflation factor scores (VIFs) from the regression equations were inspected to test for 
possible multicollinearity. With all VIFs reported in the Stage 1 regression tests ranging 
from 1.108 to 3.273, well within recommended levels (Hair, et al., 2010, pp. 204-205), 
there was no indication that multicollinearity is a problem in the Stage 1 model.  
Table 3.7 summarizes the regression for Stage 1, containing the results of the four 
models used to test the hypothesized relationships between formal and informal 
corruption environment and firm social irresponsibility (Hypothesis 1 and 2 respectively). 
Model 1 contains only the Stage 1 control variables. The overall control model is 
statistically significant (R2 = .256, p = .000). As expected per prior research, controls for 
Firm size (B = 1.70, p = .000), Firm age (B = .01, p < .01), and number of Foreign 
subsidiaries (B = .004, p < .01) were all confirmed to be significant positive predictors of  
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TABLE 3.6. Description and correlations of variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Mean 2.76 3.27 0.00 2.46 7.01 36,767 67.17 18.56 53.92 .09 3.89 .415 
Standard deviation 2.314 0.109 1.000 2.417 5.218 96,539 46.921 17.425 84.250 .285 4.555 .858 
1. Firm CSiR - 
     
      
2. Portfolio ICE .068 - 
    
      
3. Portfolio FCE .059 -.074 - 
   
      
4. Tobin’s q -.084* -.119** .010 - 
  
      
5. ROA -.019 -.111** .085* .568** - 
 
      
6. Firm Size † .483** .043 .018 -.011 .032 -       
7. Firm Experience  .256** .006 -.024 -.095* -.094* .292** -      
8. Number of Countries † .188** -.628** .126** .036 .012 .356** .239** -     
9. Foreign Subsidiaries .297** -.352** .088* -.038 -.031 .448** .256** .658** -    
10. Home Country -.096* -.168** .269** .069 .027 -.202** -.158** -.132** .019 -   
11. Firm CSR .460** -.071 .001 .005 .060 .595** .318** .392** .392** -.183** -  
12. Leverage .004 .067 -.007 .520** -.014 .045 .062 -.002 .004 -.052 -.005 - 
13. Industry–Consumer Disc .008 .092* -.050 .093* .132** .157** -.060 -.154** -.109** -.020 .003 .038 
14. Industry–Cons Staples .123** .019 .137** .039 .072 .104** .153** .041 -.007 -.031 .187** .033 
15. Industry–Energy  .169** .090* .004 -.059 -.012 -.081* .009 -.045 -.007 .002 -.036 -.026 
16. Industry–Financials -.007 .172** -.042 -.077* -.170** .032 .238** -.048 .045 .107** .079* -.036 
17. Industry–Healthcare -.128** -.049 -.051 .002 .072 -.005 -.065 .053 .045 -.029 .034 -.021 
18. Industry–Industrials .014 -.028 -.036 .000 -.062 .082* .111** .037 .136** -.008 -.112** .090* 
19. Industry–Info Tech -.221** -.240** .062 .041 -.032 -.188** -.325** .111** -.057 .048 -.093* -.121** 
20. Industry–Materials  .103** -.082* .031 -.053 .011 -.099** .081* .064 .010 -.056 -.007 .013 
21. Industry–Telco .034 .062 -.053 -.048 -.030 .016 -.059 .013 -.022 .014 .020 .010 
22. Industry–Utilities .084* .172** -.028 -.085* -.101** -.047 .025 -.125** -.063 -.049 .047 .027 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests) 
† Statistics represent variable post logarithmic transformation 
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TABLE 3.6. Description and correlations of variables (continued) 
Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Mean .19 .07 .06 .08 .09 .19 .20 .08 .01 .02 
Standard deviation .389 .263 .243 .276 .289 .391 .398 .274 .106 .154 
13. Industry–Consumer Disc - 
     
    
14. Industry–Cons Staples -.136** - 
    
    
15. Industry–Energy  -.124** -.073 - 
   
    
16. Industry–Financials -.144** -.085* -.078* - 
  
    
17. Industry–Healthcare -.152** -.090* -.082* -.095* - 
 
    
18. Industry–Industrials -.230** -.136** -.124** -.144** -.152** -     
19. Industry–Info Tech -.237** -.141** -.129** -.149** -.157** -.238** -    
20. Industry–Materials  -.142** -.084* -.077* -.090* -.095* -.143** -.148** -   
21. Industry–Telco -.051 -.031 -.028 -.032 -.034 -.052 -.053 -.032 -  
22. Industry–Utilities -.075* -.045 -.041 -.047 -.050 -.076* -.078* -.047 -.017 - 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests) 
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CSiR. The Number of countries was also significant (B = -.38, p < .05); however, the 
resulting negative coefficient was opposite direction of what has been predicted in prior 
CSiR research, where greater international scope was found to be positively related to 
CSiR (Strike, et al., 2006). The dummy variable controlling for Home country was not 
found to be significant (B = -.05, n.s.) 
 
TABLE 3.7. Regression results for Stage 1 (Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
Variables  
Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2  
FCE 
Model 3  
ICE 
Model 4 
Model 2 + ICE 
Intercept -4.49 
(.65) 
 
-4.38 
(.66) 
 
-11.52 
(3.38) 
-10.84 
(3.41) 
 Firm Size  1.70*** 
(.16) 
1.69*** 
(.16) 
1.60*** 
(.16) 
1.60*** 
(.16) 
Firm Experience (Age) .01*** 
(.002) 
.01*** 
(.002) 
.01*** 
(.002) 
.01*** 
(.002) 
Number of Countries -.38** 
(.23) 
-.44** 
(.23) 
.03 
(.30) 
-.06 
(.30) 
Number Foreign Subsidiaries .004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
Home Country Dummy -.05 
(.28) 
-.19 
(.29) 
.13 
(.29) 
-.02 
(.31) 
Portfolio FCE - 
 
.14** 
(.08) 
- .12* 
(.08) 
Portfolio ICE - 
 
- 2.15** 
(1.01) 
1.97** 
(1.02) 
R-square  .256 .259 .261 .263 
Adjusted R-square  .251 .253 .255 .256 
Change in R-square - .003 .005 .004 
F-value for change in R2  - 2.984 4.488 3.732 
F-value sig. for change in R2  - .085 .034 .054 
Overall F-value  47.746**
* 
40.400*** 40.737*** 35.298*** 
Dependent variable = CSiR in all models. 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed tests). n = 699 in all models. 
Unstandardized coefficients with corresponding standard errors in parentheses. 
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Model 2 adds the independent variable FCE to Model 1. The overall Model 2 is 
statistically significant (R2 = .259, p = .000) and represents a statistically significant 
change in R2 over Model 1 (change in R2 = 0.003, p < 0.1). Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
higher formal corruption environment levels in the MNE’s location portfolio (FCE) will 
be related to higher levels of firm irresponsibility. FCE was found to be positively related 
to firm CSiR (B = .14, p < 0.05). This result supports Hypothesis 1: MNEs operating in 
location portfolios containing higher formal corruption environments on average have 
higher levels of CSiR. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher MNE portfolio informal corruption 
environments would also be related to higher levels of firm irresponsibility. Model 3 adds 
the independent variable ICE to the Model 1 controls. The overall model was significant 
(R2 = .261, p = .000) with a significant change in R2 (change in R2 = 0.005, p < 0.05). 
ICE was confirmed to be positively related to firm CSiR (B = 2.15, p < 0.05) in Model 3. 
This supports Hypothesis 2: MNEs operating in location portfolios containing higher 
informal corruption environments on average have higher levels of CSiR. 
In Model 4 the effects of formal and informal corruption environments tested in 
Stage 1 were regressed together to confirm the incremental additive explanatory power of 
the informal element over the formal corruption environment alone. Model 4 adds ICE as 
an independent variable to Model 2, producing a significant overall model (R2 = .263, p = 
.000) with a statistically significant change in R2 (change in R2 = 0.004, p < 0.1). ICE 
was again confirmed to be significant (B = 1.97, p < 0.05). The Stage 1 regression results 
of Model 4, therefore, support the notion that the informal dimension of corruption has 
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incremental explanatory power beyond the formal corruption environment in predicting 
the social irresponsibility of MNEs. 
Predicted CSiR values from Model 4 were retained for use in the second stage of 
the 2SLS regression. The Predicted CSiR values represent the expected MNE social 
irresponsibility levels given the levels of formal and informal corruption in the firm’s 
portfolio of locations. 
Table 3.8 provides the results of second stage of the instrumental 2SLS 
regression2, which tests Hypothesis 3. The Stage 2 equations were tested separately using 
two different measures of firm performance as the dependent variable. Models 5 and 6 
used ROA as the performance measure; Models 7 and 8 used Tobin’s q for performance. 
Of the 699 firms in the sample, 51 did not report sufficient financial information to 
calculate performance measures, resulting in a sample n = 648 firms for the Stage 2 
regression tests. With the exception of several Industry controls, Stage 2 VIF scores for 
my variables of interest ranged from 1.024 – 3.206, well within acceptable 
multicollinearity levels (Hair, et al., 2010, pp. 204-205).  
Model 5 (using ROA as the dependent variable) contains only the Stage 2 control 
variables. The Stage 1 control variables (e.g. Firm size) are not re-introduced here as 
controls against firm performance because they are already embedded within the 
Predicted CSiR values saved in Stage 1 and used as the independent variable in Stage 2, 
and the same variable cannot be entered twice into a regression equation. The overall  
                                                          
2 It has been noted that running 2SLS equations as separate regressions may result in invalid standard errors 
(Wooldridge, 2009, p. 522). For this reason it is recommended that 2SLS regressions be run using the 
functions built into statistical packages such as SPSS, the tool utilized in this study. To address this 
potential issue, I also ran my regression model using the built-in SPSS 2SLS regression function. The 
results of this analysis produced results similar to those reported above, finding a significant negative 
relationship between CSiR and Tobin’s q (B = -.160, std. error = .065, p < .01) as predicted in Hypothesis 3. 
CSiR and ROA was not significant using the built-in 2SLS function (B = .016, std. error = .141, n.s.). 
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TABLE 3.8. Regression results for Stage 2 (Hypothesis 3)  
Variables Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 
 
5.32 
(1.94) 
6.22 
(1.99) 
.58 
(.78) 
1.20 
(.79) 
Firm CSR .05 
(.05) 
.11** 
(.06) 
.01 
(.02) 
.05** 
(.02) 
Firm Leverage -.12 
(.24) 
-.11 
(.24) 
1.50*** 
(.09) 
1.51*** 
(.09) 
Industry – Consumer Disc 2.97* 
(1.97) 
3.13* 
(1.97) 
1.60** 
(.79) 
1.71** 
(.78) 
Industry – Consumer Staples 2.71* 
(2.05) 
2.79* 
(2.05) 
1.41** 
(.82) 
1.46** 
(.81) 
Industry – Energy 1.33 
(2.08) 
1.34 
(2.08) 
.83 
(.83) 
.83 
(.82) 
Industry – Financials -2.27 
(2.12) 
-2.16 
(2.11) 
.64 
(.85) 
.71 
(.84) 
Industry – Healthcare 2.67* 
(2.03) 
2.65* 
(2.02) 
1.34** 
(.81) 
1.33** 
(.80) 
Industry – Industrials .97 
(1.98) 
1.20 
(1.98) 
1.02* 
(.79) 
1.18* 
(.78) 
Industry – Info Technology 1.23 
(1.98) 
1.07 
(1.97) 
1.76** 
(.79) 
1.64** 
(.78) 
Industry – Materials 1.75 
(2.04) 
1.68 
(2.04) 
.76 
(.82) 
.72 
(.81) 
Industry – Utilities -1.81 
(2.30) 
-1.89 
(2.30) 
-.27 
(.92) 
-.33 
(.91) 
Predicted Firm CSiR - -.44** 
(.22) 
- -.31*** 
(.09) 
R-square   .068 .074 .307 .319 
Adjusted R-square  .052 .056 .295 .306 
Change in R2 - .006 - .013 
F-value for change in R2  - 3.843 - 11.719 
F-value sig. for change in R2  - .050 - .001 
Overall F-value  4.213*** 4.200*** 25.562*** 24.803*** 
Dependent variable = ROA in Models 5 & 6; Tobin’s q in Models 7 & 8. 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed tests). n = 648 in all models.  
Unstandardized coefficients with corresponding standard errors in parentheses. 
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Model 5 was statistically significant, but produced a relatively low R2 (R2 = .068, p = 
.000). Neither CSR nor Leverage was found to be a significant predictor of ROA. Three of 
the Industry controls were found to be significant: consumer discretionary (B = 2.97, p < 
0.1), consumer staples (B = 2.71, p < 0.1), and healthcare (B = 2.67, p < 0.1).  
Model 6 added the independent variable to Model 5, regressing the first of my 
performance measure dependent variables, ROA, against the independent variable 
Predicted CSiR retained from Stage 1 (Model 4). Using the Predicted CSiR values as the 
independent variable provides an analysis of the performance impact of social 
irresponsibility given the firm’s locations’ levels of formal and informal corruption.  
Model 6 produced a significant overall model (R2 = .074, p = .000) with a statistically 
significant change in R2 (change in R2 = 0.006, p = 0.05). Predicted CSiR was negatively 
related to ROA (B = -.44, p = 0.05), providing initial support for Hypothesis 3.  
Models 7 and 8 repeated the Hypothesis 3 tests using the second performance 
measure, Tobin’s q, in a similar fashion to Models 5 and 6. Model 7 again contains only 
the control variables. The overall model was significant (R2 = .307, p = .000). Although 
CSR was again not significant, in this model Leverage was strongly significant (B = 1.50, 
p = .000). Under Model 7, five of the Industry dummies were significant: consumer 
discretionary goods (B = 1.60, p < 0.05), consumer staples (B = 1.41, p < 0.05), 
healthcare (B = 1.34, p < 0.05), industrials (B = 1.02, p < 0.1), and information 
technology (B = 1.76, p < 0.05).  
Model 8 adds the independent variable saved from Stage 1, Predicted CSiR, to the 
Stage 2 equation. Model 8 produced a significant overall model (R2 = .319, p = .000) 
with a statistically significant change in R2 (change in R2 = 0.013, p < 0.01). Predicted 
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CSiR was confirmed to be a significant negative predictor of Tobin’s q (B = -.31, p < 
0.01). The significant performance analysis results in the Model 8 Tobin’s q test (and to a 
lesser extent, the Model 6 ROA test) provide support for Hypothesis 3: MNEs with higher 
levels of social irresponsibility on average have lower performance than MNEs with 
lower levels of social irresponsibility. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study I began by considering whether MNEs that are operating in high 
corruption environments are more likely to be socially irresponsible. Recognizing that 
corruption is a relevant element of MNE’s institutional environments, institutional theory 
posits that firms are subject to pressures exerted upon them from their institutional 
environments in an effort to gain local legitimacy.  
I theorized that firms operating in portfolios of locations characterized by 
pervasive formal corruption in the public sector will increase the firm’s likelihood of 
committing socially irresponsible actions. The negative influence of corruption may not 
only encourage firms to side-step socially responsible behavior, but the additional costs 
and risks associated with corrupt businesses may result in lack of CSR investments and 
lead to higher CSiR. Corrupt business practices may become formally instantiated within 
the organization.  
I further hypothesized that in addition to the negative impacts associated with 
formal corruption environments, MNEs may also face more CSiR because of the 
influence of informal corruption in their operating environments. Informal corruption 
represents the general permeation of corrupt behavior beyond just public sector 
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corruption to incorporate all aspects of a society, reflecting the corruption experienced by 
average individual citizens in their everyday experiences. Environments higher in 
informal corruption may exert pressure to act corruptly in everyday life (not just 
corporate-public sector interactions) and thus may result in more tolerance and higher 
occurrence of socially irresponsible decisions and outcomes. 
I tested my hypotheses on a sample of 699 MNEs using each firm’s entire 
subsidiary location portfolio. As expected, my tests confirmed the link between 
corruption environments and irresponsibility. Firms operating in environments that have 
higher average overall levels of formal and/or informal levels of corruption in their 
operating environments can be expected to have correspondingly higher levels of CSiR.  
Additionally I suggested that firms with higher CSiR levels will also have lower 
performance. Socially irresponsible behavior may create additional risk and costs 
associated with dealing with NGO anti-irresponsibility activism and/or regulatory threats 
and other government actions due to CSiR exposure. Additionally, firms may have to 
expend resources to react to specific incidents and patterns of CSiR or risk losing trust 
and legitimacy with their local markets. As hypothesized, tests using multiple measures 
of performance on a sample of 648 MNEs confirmed that higher CSiR is related to lower 
overall firm performance. Although both the ROA- and Tobin’s q-based models 
produced significant results as hypothesized, CSiR was found to be a better predictor of 
performance when measured via Tobin’s q as opposed to via ROA. This finding makes 
sense given that Tobin’s q is considered a longer-term performance measure, whereas 
ROA is a shorter-term measure (Short, Ketchen Jr, Palmer, & Hult, 2007), and social 
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responsibility investments and impacts generally have long-term orientations (Wang & 
Bansal, 2012).  
 
Contribution 
This study’s findings make several unique contributions to the international 
business and social responsibility literature. First, this study is research-opening in that it 
finds initial support for the suggestion that just as firms are rewarded for their positive 
CSR, their performance may likewise be penalized for high levels CSiR. A large 
percentage of the CSR research examines the CSR-performance relationship, but this 
study’s findings indicate that the CSiR-performance relationship may be equally 
deserving of research attention. 
Second, based on North’s institutional model (1990), this study is the first to 
conceptualize institutionalized corruption as having both a formal and informal 
dimension. The regressions were executed hierarchically to emphasize that both the 
formal and informal corruption dimensions contribute independently to social 
irresponsibility. The typical focus in corruption-related research is on corruption in the 
public sector, formal corruption. This study’s empirical results suggest that in addition to 
the formal corruption environment, firms may also face separate additive impacts from 
their informal corruption environment. Adding the informal dimension provides a 
research contribution because with it we can better explain CSiR. The traditional method 
(of conceptualizing formal corruption only) does not do as good of a job of explaining as 
when we add in the informal dimension and may be an overly simplistic way of looking 
at corruption. Therefore, future corruption researchers may wish to incorporate both the 
formal and informal dimensions of corruption in future studies.  
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Finally, this is also the first social irresponsibility study to conceptualize the MNE 
as a portfolio of locations, holistically considering the corruption impacts from the firm’s 
entire set of operating locations on their social irresponsibility. Future research examining 
the influence of external elements such as formal and informal institutions on social 
irresponsibility and/or responsibility may want to consider utilizing the portfolio 
conceptualization in their studies. 
 
Managerial Implications 
The empirical support for my hypotheses leads to two managerial 
recommendations. First, MNEs may be able to reduce their CSiR exposure by balancing 
corruption considerations in their country selection decisions. My findings help us 
understand how a specific aspect of the institutional environment – corruption - across a 
firm’s entire portfolio of locations may have an impact on the firm’s social 
irresponsibility outcomes. Firms operating in portfolios of locations with lower formal 
and/or informal corruption levels may be at an advantage in terms of CSiR. These results 
provide guidance in country selection and social responsibility strategy for MNE 
managers concerned about minimizing incidents of social irresponsibility. 
Second I take an initial step in proposing and empirically confirming the notion 
that MNEs with higher levels of CSiR may be outperformed by firms with lower levels of 
social irresponsibility. There is a rich research stream underway examining the 
relationships between positive social performance and firm financial performance, but the 
social irresponsibility-performance link is unexplored. My results suggest that there is a 
performance cost associated with maintaining high levels of CSiR that MNE managers 
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may want to consider when setting social responsibility strategies and making country 
selection decisions.  
 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. Although the KLD dataset is overwhelmingly 
accepted in CSR and CSiR research (Wood, 2010), it has some limitations in terms of 
international coverage which I have attempted to account for in the research design. The 
KLD rating data is comprised of firms which are still overwhelmingly U.S.-based. To 
address this limitation and maintain an international focus, this study considers the 
corruption impact of the MNE’s entire portfolio of locations, not just the headquarters 
country. In the future there may be better ways to measure CSiR which may further 
address or eliminate this limitation and enable testing of the model using a broader global 
sample. Whereas there are other available options for measuring CSR, other social 
responsibility ratings do not provide a set of measures that examine irresponsibility 
separately. This makes measuring CSiR offers more of a research challenge for the 
future, particularly in an international context. Improved CSiR measures may also help 
improve the R-squares of irresponsibility-related research models. 
The portfolio operationalization technique used in this study also has some 
limitations in that each subsidiary is weighted equally in the calculation of portfolio-level 
variables. Certain subsidiaries may be more strategically important or more relevant to a 
MNE’s social responsibility-related outcomes than others. Future researchers may be able 
to identify theoretically-based methods of weighting subsidiaries differently that can be 
supported by available data sources. 
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Additionally, this study utilizes nation-level attributes of formal and informal 
corruption to explore the environmental effects of corruption on MNE social 
irresponsibility and subsequent performance. Country-level attributes do not necessarily 
capture any within-country variance that may exist. It is possible that the specific 
geographic locations of the MNE’s presence in a particular region within a given country 
might exhibit significantly different levels of formal and/or informal corruption which 
could affect the results. Future measurements may provide for more institutional 
granularity, enabling within-country analysis of different levels of institutionalized 
corruption. 
Finally, this study is cross-sectional, measuring phenomena at a particular point in 
time. Future research may want to explore the relationships between corruption, CSiR, 
and performance via a longitudinal design. However, because institutional elements do 
not tend to radically change year-over-year, future studies would need to be conducted 
either over very long periods of time or alternatively could focus on particular subsets of 
the world that are experiencing more rapid institutional changes (e.g. emerging markets).  
 
Conclusion 
By conceptualizing and testing corruption as a multi-dimensional construct, this 
study highlights the influence exerted on MNE by the formal and informal corruption 
levels of its entire portfolio of subsidiary locations. Corruption environments can affect 
firms’ social irresponsibility outcomes. MNEs that operating in locations that have higher 
average levels of formal and/or informal corruption environments are more likely to have 
correspondingly higher levels of CSiR. Furthermore, this study’s results suggest that 
higher CSiR is linked to lower firm performance. If minimizing levels of CSiR is a 
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strategic priority for the firm, managers should consider national formal and informal 
corruption profiles in their country selection decisions to minimize the impact of 
corruption environments on their social irresponsibility. 
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APPENDIX A 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION FINDINGS 
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TABLE A.1. Dissertation findings and associated managerial and research implications 
Main findings Managerial implications Research implications 
Greater informal institutional 
distance between the MNE’s 
headquarters and subsidiary 
locations negatively influences 
firm CSP. 
To reduce the decline in firm CSP, MNE managers 
should select countries whose cultural profiles are more 
similar to the headquarters culture. 
Experience associated with learning about one culture 
does not negate the need to learn about every new 
culture. 
The CSP dynamics associated with cultural 
distance need to be further investigated using 
other measures of informal institutional distance. 
Formal institutional distance 
reduces the CSP benefits of 
greater international scope. 
Entering more countries expands firm learning and leads 
to higher CSP. However, if new countries have 
significantly higher CSP standards than the firm’s current 
locations, overall firm CSP may not increase as much 
because prior firm experience is not as applicable in the 
new higher-standard countries. 
MNEs from lower social responsibility regions (e.g. 
emerging markets) are at a particular disadvantage in this 
regard because a large percentage of potential markets 
have higher CSP standards. 
Consider the asymmetric nature of formal 
institutional distance; maintain sign and direction 
to reflect the hierarchy of stringency in country-
level formal regulatory institutions. 
 
 
Formal and informal 
institutional distances produce 
different dynamics relative to 
social responsibility. 
MNE managers should balance consideration of both the 
cultural and regulatory aspects of their new country 
selections. 
Symmetry of formal and informal institutional 
dynamics should not necessarily be assumed. 
Future international business research into 
possible different dynamics of formal and 
informal differences needs to be investigated.  
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TABLE A.1. Dissertation findings and associated managerial and research implications (continued) 
Main findings Managerial implications Research implications 
Higher levels of both formal 
and informal corruption 
environments in a MNE’s 
operating locations are related 
to higher levels of firm CSiR. 
To avoid higher firm CSiR, MNE managers should select 
countries characterized by lower formal and informal 
corruption environments. 
Future research should consider the impact of the 
corruption profiles of the firm’s operating 
locations on other social responsibility-related 
outcomes. 
Informal corruption has a 
separate and incremental impact 
over formal corruption on 
CSiR. 
MNE outcomes are affected by both the level of formal 
public sector corruption and the general permeation of 
corruption within the society. 
International business researchers should 
consider informal corruption as a distinct 
dimension of institutionalized corruption in 
future studies.  
Higher levels of CSiR are 
related to lower firm 
performance. 
To improve firm performance, MNE managers should 
reduce or eliminate socially irresponsible behavior. 
A foundation is set for additional research into 
the irresponsibility-performance relationship. 
The institutional profiles of a 
MNE’s entire portfolio of 
operating locations have an 
impact on the firm’s CSP and 
CSiR. 
The headquarters country influences are not the only 
location consideration for MNEs. Each subsidiary 
location country choice also may have a potential impact 
on the firm’s social responsibility and irresponsibility 
outcomes.  
 
The operating portfolio is based on a 
consideration of the full set of subsidiary 
operating locations specific to a given MNE and 
may provide a useful vantage point from which 
to explore other institutional dynamics relative to 
MNEs. 
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SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to describe the procedures used for secondary data 
collection and preparation in the two empirical dissertation studies. Although Paper 1 and 
Paper 2 utilized completely separate sample frames, samples, and independent and 
dependent variables, the same basic process that blended firm, subsidiary, and country 
data via portfolio-level operationalization was utilized for both papers. The general 
mechanics of this data collection process are described within this appendix. 
In addition to SPSS, the tools utilized for data manipulation in the dissertation 
studies included Excel, Oracle, and TOAD. Data sourced from public and subscription 
database sources were downloaded locally as Excel spreadsheets. The Excel spreadsheets 
were uploaded into an Oracle 11g relational database (here forth referred to as the 
“Research Database”). Extracts from the Research Database were used to create the final 
samples which were imported into SPSS for analysis. The widely used TOAD database 
tool was used for all database uploads, queries, and extracts. Figure B.1 provides an 
overview of the tables, relevant data elements, and data relationships in the resulting 
logical data model created for the empirical studies. 
The first step in creating the study samples was to establish the initial firm 
samples based on availability of social responsibility/irresponsibility data. The sample 
frames for both studies were third party social responsibility ratings datasets. Paper 1 
Utilized the CSRHub dataset; Paper 2 utilized the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) 
ratings. CSRHub provides publicly available data which was downloaded in spreadsheet 
form from the CSRHub website (www.csrhub.com). The KLD dataset is propriety and 
was not available via any existing Kennesaw State database subscriptions. For this
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COMPANY
COMPANY_ID (unique key)
COMPANY_NAME
STOCK_TICKER
COUNTRY (Headquarters)
EMPLOYEES
YEAR_FOUNDED
INDUSTRY
TOBINSQ
ROA
DEBT_EQUITY_RATIO
PORTFOLIO
PARENT_COMPANY_ID
NUMBER_COUNTRIES
Paper 1 Portfolio Elements:
AVERAGE_PDI_DISTANCE
AVERAGE_UAI_DISTANCE
AVERAGE_IDV_DISTANCE
AVERAGE_MAS_DISTANCE
AVERAGE_EPI_DISTANCE
Paper 2 Portfolio Elements:
FOREIGN_SUBSIDIARIES
AVERAGE_GCB
AVERAGE_CPI
AVERAGE_WGI_GE
AVERAGE_WGI_RQ
AVERAGE_WGI_CC
SUBSIDIARY
PARENT_COMPANY_ID
COMPANY_ID (of subsidiary)
COMPANY_NAME (of subsidiary)
COUNTRY (subsidiary location)
COUNTRY
COUNTRY_CODE
COUNTRY_NAME
Paper 1 Country Elements:
HOFSTEDE_PDI
HOFSTEDE_UAI
HOFSTEDE_IDV
HOFSTEDE_MAS
EPI
Paper 2 Country Elements:
CPI
GCB
WGI_GE
WGI_RQ
WGI_CC
CSR_KLD (Paper 2)
COMPANY_NAME
CSR_STRENGTHS (binary indicators)
CSR_WEAKNESSES (binary indicators)
CSR_CSRHUB (Paper 1)
COMPANY_NAME
COUNTRY
OVERALL_CSR_SCORE
 
FIGURE B.1. Logical data model 
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reason, the KLD data was purchased in spreadsheet form personally by the author from 
the dataset’s current owner, MSCI, Inc. (www.msci.com). The CSR datasets each 
contained company name, headquarters country (for CSRHub), and a variety of different 
social responsibility ratings (in different categories and sub-categories in the case of 
KLD).  
SPSS was used to identify random selections of firms from each CSR spreadsheet 
(n = 450 from CSRHub for Paper 1; n = 700 from KLD for Paper 2, for a total of 1,150 
firms). The selected firms and their associated CSR-related scores were used to populate 
two new tables in the Research Database (CSR_CSRHUB and CSR_KLD).  
The next step in the data collection process was to match each sample firm 
selected from the CSR datasets with its corresponding firm demographic data. The source 
of firm demographic data was the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database (accessed via 
Kennesaw State subscription).Company name and headquarters country (when available) 
were used to identify each of the 1,150 sample firms in Capital IQ. Extracts from Capital 
IQ and name-matching queries were created to semi-automate the matching process. 
However, because specific company naming conventions rarely match exactly between 
two different data sources (e.g. one source may use “Apple” whereas another uses 
“Apple, Inc.”), each of the 1,150 distinct company names had to be manually confirmed 
and updated individually.  
Entries in the Research Database were made for each CSR-Capital IQ firm match. 
First, an entry in the COMPANY table was created containing basic firm information: 
company name, headquarters country, number of employees, year founded, and industry. 
Because Capital IQ company names include parenthetical stock tickers (e.g. Apple is 
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actually called “Apple [NYSE:APP]” in Capital IQ), an algorithm was created to 
systematically strip off the stock tickers into their own data element in the COMPANY 
table. The corresponding company number found in Capital IQ for each matched firm 
was added to the corresponding CSR table to enable cross-referencing. 
Because Paper 2’s research model includes firm performance-related variables, 
several additional firm-level data elements were also extracted from Capital IQ and 
stored with the Research Database COMPANY data for all Paper 2 firms: return on assets 
(ROA); Tobin’s q; total debt and total equity (used to calculated leverage).  
Both dissertation studies are based on the availability of portfolio-level measures 
for each firm. Portfolio measures take specific measurements at the subsidiary level 
(based on the country location of each subsidiary), and then all of the subsidiary values 
for the firm are averaged together to create portfolio-level variables for each firm.  
To accomplish this, first each sample firm’s entire set of subsidiary locations were 
extracted from Capital IQ and loaded into the SUBSIDIARY table in the Research 
Database. Capital IQ provides an extract capability that outputs all of a firm’s 
subsidiaries in Excel spreadsheet form. This subsidiary spreadsheet was individually 
extracted for each of the 1,150 sample firms. A special upload utility was written to take 
the subsidiary number, company name, and country from each of Capital IQ spreadsheet. 
This data was used to populate a new SUBSIDIARY table in the Research Database. 
The next step involved preparing the country variables upon which the portfolio-
level variables would be based. The required country-level data elements were retrieved 
from public sources as described in detail in the Methodology sections of each 
dissertation paper and summarized in Table B.1 below. The country data was used to 
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populate a COUNTRY_MASTER table in the Research Database. To enable matching 
country information from different sources, country names were normalized to United 
Nations country naming standards.  
 
TABLE B.1. Country-level data elements and sources used to create portfolio measures 
Paper Country-level element Source 
Paper 1 Hofstede cultural attributes  
(PDI, IDV, UAI, MAS) 
www.geert-hofstede.com 
 Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI) 
http:\\epi.yale.edu 
 
   
Paper 2 Global Corruption Barometer 
(GCB) 
www.transparency.org/research/gcb 
 Corruption Perception Index  
(CPI) 
http:\\cpi.transparency.org 
 World Governance Indicators 
(WGI CC, GE, RQ) 
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi  
 
 
 
Once the social responsibility rating, firm, subsidiary, and country master data 
tables were all prepared in the Research Database, the corresponding portfolio-level 
measurements for each Paper 1 and Paper 2 firm were calculated combining data from all 
four sources. Based on institutional distance theory, the portfolio-level measurements for 
Paper 1 involved calculating the difference between attributes of each firm subsidiary 
country and the firm headquarters country. Each Paper 1’s subsidiary-HQ differences 
were then averaged to obtain firm-level average portfolio distances. The Paper 2 
portfolio-level measurements were conceptualized to represent the firm’s overall 
portfolio environment and were therefore calculated as the average of all locations, 
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including both subsidiary and headquarters in a single average per firm. Once calculated, 
each of the portfolio-level measures were stored in a PORTFOLIO table. 
Special scripts were also written to calculate several other measures required for 
the dissertation studies, such as the Number of countries (number of distinct countries in 
which the firm has a headquarters and/or subsidiary location, used in both Paper 1 and 2) 
and Number of foreign subsidiaries (calculated based on count of subsidiary records for 
each firm that were located in a country different than the headquarters country, used in 
Paper 2). These fields were also stored in the PORTFOLIO table entry for each firm. 
Once all of the portfolio-level variables were calculated, the corresponding 
samples for the Paper 1 and Paper 2 firms could be exported from the Research Database 
as Excel spreadsheets that were then imported into SPSS for data analysis. Table B.2 
summarizes the large number of total number of records created and manipulated in the 
Research Database that were required to prepare the samples for the dissertation studies. 
 
TABLE B.2. Total count of records created in preparation of dissertation samples 
Table name Total record count 
CSR_CSRHUB 5,662 
CSR_KLD 2,965 
COMPANY  1,150 
SUBSIDIARY  125,532 
COUNTRY_MASTER 231 
PORTFOLIO  1,150 
 
